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# West Europe Report

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23 JULY 1986

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DEVELOPMENT, CONTEMPORARY ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS ANALYZED

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 24 May 86 p 15

[Article by Ernst Guenter Vetter, senior editor and member of the board of the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE: "Radicalism on the Wrong Road: Unions Between Employee Representation and Political Battalion--the DGB Congress in Hamburg"]

[Text] There is no union organization in a democratic state which enjoys greater respect and at the same time possesses more power than the DGB. But it is increasingly evident that the facade is crumbling from the proud building. The scandals about the "Neue Heimat" hit the unions in a sensitive spot. Membership growth is stagnating; there is no sign of young people flocking to join the union in droves. The functionaries are helpless in the face of the question of how they are to draw employees into union organizations or to keep highly qualified skilled workers in them. The unions appear to be helpless in the face of the greatest problems of our time: coming to grips with the technical revolution, and helping to shape different forms of working life and of free time. They demand of others that unemployment should be stemmed, but they themselves are devoid of constructive proposals. Behind a fading splendor crisis is lurking. The Federal Congress of the German Trade Union Federation which begins this weekend will in part be shaped by this situation.

In the history of the worker movement there have often been critical periods. Bans, persecutions and personal danger were milestones on a path which has only gradually led to the sunlit heights of the present. But those were counterblows offered to the unions by opponents. Now those who are responsible for their difficulties must be sought among their own ranks. The claim--put forward with pathetic earnestness--that the government and the employers are deviously plotting to put an end to the unions in a hostile environment sounds like a simple-minded fairy-tale in view of their general reputation. Certainly it is true that unions which in the view of all political parties have become an established component of a democratic order can no longer behave today as though they were still obliged to free themselves from subservience with the methods of an outmoded class warfare.

The peak in the development of the worker movement was not reached until the great economic and social successes of the last 40 years had been made possible in a genuinely functional parliamentary democracy and under a free economic constitution. These fundamental changes in state, society

and economy should really have forced the unions to achieve a new understanding of themselves. But this is where the dilemma arises.

The great majority of functionaries are avowedly democratic; but many of them believe that they are obliged to undermine and if necessary eliminate the free economy as a reincarnation of the capitalism they hate. They even feel themselves to be self-appointed guardians over this democracy, supposed, as the representatives of all workers, to represent the interests of citizens in general. This exaggerated opinion of themselves, along with their ominous misinterpretation of a free economic order, acts as a barrier which has so far prevented a realistic recognition of their functions within the framework of a modern liberal world. They do not feel themselves to be a special interest group in the framework of a free economic order, but a unique authority legitimized by its social goals, standing outside the parties and thus able to prescribe to them the principles of action.

Most recently, the battle about paragraph 116 has drastically revealed this attitude. If unions had to fight for their existence, extreme excitement would be understandable. But in this case a government has dared to show the ever-expanding power monopoly of an association what its limits are. In this dispute the unions have repeatedly characterized themselves as a political battalion marching against a certain government. Statements about the proclamations of 1 May, especially from the circle of IG Metall, prove that union functionaries want to use their organizations as instruments to change to social and political conditions of the state. This goes beyond the limits of what is tolerable. For when an interest group uses its extraordinary power to change the system, the stability of democratic order is endangered.

#### Social Progress, too, Must Have its Limits

At all these stages it was often difficult to achieve success, but it was easy to formulate political goals. Demanding more and more benefits was the obvious thing to do as long as there was widespread poverty and a great gap in the standard of living. Even survivals of class warfare were still understandable as long as it was necessary to conclude from the behavior of the employers and their associations that they were reactionary enemies in the social struggle, coming from another class.

But in the FRG, at least, this picture has radically changed. The defeat of Nazi leadership and the complete destruction of political and economic structures made it possible to begin from the roots. The total collapse of the country not only demanded particular economic efforts; at the same time it offered the chance for unusual economic successes. The decisive element for progress was always that harmony of stable democracy and productive economy. The unions, with their regard for responsible behavior in wage policy and social policy, played a significant role in this success. The members of the amalgamated union which embraced all the democratic parties became a symbol of a worker movement which was to be not only a component but a stabilizer of the democratic order.

Finally what was prophesied by the great liberal union theorist Goetz Briefs in the Weimar Republic with his definition of the "established" union has been fulfilled: unions are no longer dependents in a hostile capitalist system. Now they can participate more than ever in the shaping of political and economic order.

But this means that as time goes by they too will be required to share increasingly in the responsibility for the free political and economic order which is the basis of their own existence. Even social progress must reach a limit when the social state has already achieved a high degree of perfection. A worker movement can then no longer live exclusively by the motto, "We want more!" The first requirement now ought to be: "How can we preserve the basic principles which made the great successes of the past possible and which will ensure the continued existence of free unions?"

Many perceptive union leaders recognized early on that in a changed economic and social environment strategies of cooperative partnership were bound to be more successful than class warfare. They wanted to follow the advice of the respected friend of the unions, the Jesuit priest Professor von Nell-Breuning; thirty years ago he had already challenged the unions to explain first what it is that they want, so that they may recognize what they ought to want. Such clarification should have seemed an obvious course, since pragmatic behavior has always been a characteristic of German unions. During their history they have usually concentrated on achieving their successes within the system they are put into. Functionaries who have their roots in socialism also hoped that one day they would come to a threshold at which a transition from capitalism to socialism would become possible.

In the face of a liberal economic order that no longer fits into the pigeon-hole of socialism, accommodation is now more difficult than in earlier days. But the manifest social advances and above all the unique achievement of an amalgamated union encompassing all the democratic parties actually should have made a fundamental change in their way of thinking inevitable. Yet this transformation did not occur. The causes may be traced above all to the inability of socialists in the unions to keep pace with progress in economy and society. The unions with socialist orientation were the strongest ones even in the days when the union movement was still politically splintered. Even in those days they determined the goals of social dispute. Today they predominate in the amalgamated union too. It is true that some individual union leaders, like the Social Democrat Georg Leber, showed themselves equal to the task of leading the unions into a new era assigned to them by Nell-Breuning. Others are trying to follow this path today.

But in the face of growing difficulties, when only relatively minor social successes are to be expected, when unemployment is spreading and overcoming it requires limitations for jobholders, when the economy must grow into altered structures at the cost of great effort, more and more functionaries are following not shrewd political insights but radical counsel. They ignore the fact that in a free order stubborn confrontation cannot solve a single difficult question.



Still, for several years there has been discussion in the federation of unions about whether they should regard themselves as an element in an ordered society or as an opposing force. The course of this discussion has revealed that many socialist unionists do not wish to allow themselves to be incorporated into a liberal order. They are not able or willing to come up with a design which integrates the unions into a free order. They prefer to retreat into the inflexible framework of old socialist ideas. It is characteristic of this flight into the past that union functionaries too are now offering themselves as allies to the Greens in conversation and at congresses. Changing the system is here the unifying bond of burgeoning sympathy.

#### An Old Discussion: A Factor in the Social Order or an Opposing Force

In this socialist-Green world, to be sure, one of the most important union tasks would pass into the power of the state or of "society": the setting of wages. In a free order, unions are supposed to determine the wages together with the employers' associations. Thus they have at their disposal one of the most important factors in economic policy and at the same time, if the level of wages no longer corresponds to the strength of the economy, a large potential for making trouble. Thus, together with the employers, and by means of compromises which are often difficult, they must find the point at which wages do not put a brake on economic progress, which is precisely what gives their members and the employers their high standard of living.

In this task the role of the unions in the social order has become particularly evident over many decades. Do they now want to withdraw from this duty also and be nothing more than a force of political opposition? Do they really want to sabotage a system on which their own existence depends? The answer is becoming more and more difficult. As an established component of a free order, unions ought to help to shape this order so that it becomes better and better, that is, more social, as they did for wage policies. They ought to become aware of their explosive power, and voluntarily curb it. The will of the voters ought to be sacred to them, and thus they ought to deal with all parties with the same impartiality. But the influence of those who wish to alter the system radically has grown. The predominance of the radicals is increasingly obscuring steps towards reason and partnership in other quarters.

Radically-minded functionaries, who do not at all represent the majority of workers, have long held key positions in the organizations. They have found a niche in union schools and newspapers and on the staff of many committees. Over the years they are doing more and more to determine the climate and the attitude of the organization. The advancing radicalization of the youth congresses, which is clearly unstoppable, but also the excesses which characterized the controversy about paragraph 116, are the most recent examples of this development.

This pushes consideration of the question of order into the background. If the concept of being nothing but a radical opposing force prevails in a union

movement, it is automatically forced into a sharper and sharper contrast to the liberal order. But this is precisely the goal for which the radical wire-pullers are consciously aiming. They do not want to foster the growth of unions; they want to use them as instruments to eliminate the free social order.

The Communist Party is likewise inevitably bound to find its most attractive field of endeavor in such unions. Its functionaries see that the party is in an unprecedented upcurrent. On the left wing of the DGB voices can already be heard defining the concept of the amalgamated union anew. They would like to put the Christian unionists "outside the boundaries," but integrate Communists all the more warmly into the union movement. The majority of functionaries do not want this affiliation; but the impression is given that--apart from a few exceptions--the defense against these efforts is being increasingly paralyzed. The more the liberal state and an upalatable government are attacked, the less fighting there is along the communist front. The notion of "anti-communism," which is taken for granted by democratic unionists, has already been given a new function as an insult and a code-word to denote supposed enemies of the union.

Thus there are smoke signals in the sky which herald dangers for the unions themselves. If a clearly visible counter-force to radical socialism and to alliances with the communists is not formed quickly, the amalgamated union will inevitably have to be dissolved. Christian Democratic employers cannot permit themselves to be made into the bogey-men of a radical socialism. Even passionate defenders of this unique and prospering form of organization, the amalgamated union, no longer rule out the possibility of its demise. Against a weak government or one which is ideologically near to them, unions which use their power unrestrainedly and openly work for a change in the system may be able to achieve their goals. But a strong government which does justice to its task of guarding the welfare of all citizens must and will curb the excessive power and the radicalism of the unions. The call from the body of all the citizens to get rid of the unions could become too powerful, as Nobel Prize winner von Hayek wrote long ago.

In the FRG such an idea still appears absurd. For a long time other countries have looked enviously at the behavior of West German unions. But such a reputation is influenced by what is past. More important is the vision of the future. It is possible to picture different lines of development. There is clearly a nucleus of important union leaders who wish to continue the style of responsible policy. They will try, when the gunsmoke of the most recent disputes has blown away, to return to reasonable cooperation with the other tariff party and neutral behavior towards the government. In this way they will meet the wishes of most of the workers and employees, who want to be certain that the government, business and unions will make a united effort to solve the difficult questions of the present, especially unemployment and structural change in the economy. Enlightened employers have long recognized that no one's interests are served by unyielding confrontation and radical tirades, least of all their own. Business councils have oriented themselves increasingly by this understanding; they distance themselves from organizations which wish to bring the style of



radical disputation into the businesses. In particular, highly qualified skilled workers and employees are alarmed rather than attracted by such behavior. But it is precisely these groups which must be the special concern of the unions.

Realistic union leaders who wish to obtain the greatest possible support among employers must help to overcome serious transitional problems in the framework of a free economic order. Nevertheless they can remain a part of the opposition. In a time of change, contrasts between different social groups are sure to emerge. The unions will then have ample opportunity to assert the interests of their members loudly and clearly. Integration into a free social order does not have to mean blurring attitudes and positions. On the contrary, by the use of critical cooperation and "forward thinking" the unions stand to gain in status and thus in inner strength.

#### From "Classical" to "Curbed" Unions

But it remains completely uncertain whether such insights can shape the behavior of the whole union federation. Radicals are setting the tone, and too many opportunists are jumping on the bandwagon. But if a union movement can think of nothing better than the alteration of an economic system which has been successful for its members, and unyielding confrontation with certain parties and the state, if it lets itself be degraded to being used as an election tool, it is literally calling down on itself that situation of relentless curbing of its power foreseen by von Hayek. The "established" union in Goetz Briefs' sense would have become the "curbed" union, that is, the union which has become insignificant as a result of its own misbehavior. The Congress of the Trade Union Federation will show which future they wish to face.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DEMOGRAPHICS OF JOB MARKET FOR UNIVERSITY GRADUATES STUDIED

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 27 May 86 p 14

[ Article by Ursula Engelen-Kefer, Vice-President of the Federal Labor Office: "Restrictive Personnel Policy Affects Opportunities"]

[Text] Qualification-specific Unemployment

In view of the continuing high unemployment in the FRG, hardly any partial sector of the job market manages to escape the generally strained situation. This also holds true for university graduates. The selection process goes on. There are more and more qualified persons among the roughly 10 percent unemployed. In turn, the best from among the qualified are selected for employment. In addition, competition for replacing lesser qualified people with better qualified ones is intensifying. There is a difference, however, to the extent in which individual segments of unemployment are involved. At present, there is an ever deepening chasm between the job market situation of unskilled persons on the one hand, and that of the skilled on the other. And this is happening while both number and proportion of the unskilled has been declining for a long time (from over 40 percent of all wage earners in 1961 to far below 30 percent in 1985).

Simultaneously, the proportion of skilled and, in particular, of highly qualified persons is growing. In 1982, university graduates made up 6 percent of the work force (1961: 3 percent); graduates of special institutes constitute another 2.7 percent.

While unemployment of unskilled workers is growing (16 percent), in the case of trained people—although unemployment is also rising—a distinct trend toward equalization in unemployment rates has developed.

University graduates, also, are less and less immune to unemployment. It is true that during 1973-1985, they always occupied the lowest level of the unemployment scale, together with graduates from specialized colleges, technical and master craftsmen's schools. The unemployment rate for university graduates is 5 percent, while the total unemployment rate was 8.7 percent at the end of September 1985. In September 1985, the number of unemployed with university or specialized college degrees, 117,500, was higher by 2,900 persons, or 3 percent, than in the same month of the

previous year. This means that the number of unemployed rose to a lesser degree than in previous years.

During the same period, unemployment rates for women in almost all training categories were distinctly higher than for men. This is also true of university graduates: in 1983, the specific rate for women university graduates was 5.7 percent (specialized college graduates, 8.7 percent), while the rate for men of the same educational background was 3.8 percent (4 percent, respectively). In 1985, the proportion of unemployed women was 48 percent, at an employment share of only 28 percent. Furthermore, three times as many women as men are working under time-limited, and therefore unstable, employment conditions.

Despite the continuing problems in the job market, it is still true that higher education goes hand in hand with relatively lower unemployment compared to a lower level of education. So far, this conclusion has been confirmed even beyond all economic fluctuations. This, however, refers to the totality of employed persons, for university graduates as well as other groups. In the following it will be shown to what extent this statement has to be modified through a more precise breakdown of university graduates into individual subdivisions, and what the major reasons are.

#### Employment of University Graduates

The annual number of graduates from scientific universities rose from 67,000 in 1970 to about 90,000 in 1985, those from specialized colleges from 20,000 to roughly 50,000.

A direct consequence of this expansion is the fact that the age pyramid of university graduates is increasingly determined by younger age groups. In 1961, for example, 28 percent of graduates in the work force were under 35; in 1982, it was already 37 percent. At the same time, the proportion of older graduates (over 50) dropped from 36 to 21 percent. As a result of this shift in the age structure, a large part of the existing jobs for graduates will be occupied for many years to come. Only minor employment impulses will come from the demand for substitutes.

A further characteristic of employment for university graduates is their high concentration in public and semi-public service (including postal service, railway, and non-profit organizations). About 68 percent of university graduates are employed there—44 percent in the education and science sector alone—, and 38 percent of the graduates of specialized colleges. As a comparison: only 23 percent of all wage earners work in public service.

For this reason, the restrictive public personnel policy pursued for years has a relatively stronger effect on employment opportunities for university graduates than for other groups. In addition, there are factors such as the declining number of children and public discussion of the usefulness of further expansion of public services. These and other

circumstances have the tendency to impede further expansion of employment in the public service sector.

These employment problems are aggravated by the fact that a large number of university graduates are being trained in fields of study which, by their educational nature, are largely tailored for employment in the public service sector. The personnel groups with limited sectoral mobility contain in particular teachers, social scientists and liberal arts majors.

The aspects mentioned so far—university expansion, age structure, public personnel policy, sectoral mobility impediments—have a rather negative effect on future employment opportunities for university graduates. However, there are also a number of aspects which have a rather positive effect on the employment situation of university graduates, compared to other groups:

--The broad professional employment spectrum for many academic fields of study, and regional mobility, permit better adaptation to structural changes in the employment system;

--The still widely existing link between university degree and executive-type career placement—particularly in public service, but also in large segments of private industry—makes it more difficult for applicants without a university degree to enter executive-type jobs;

--In the private industry sector, due to the high cost of training and employing university graduates, even for profit reasons alone companies tend to hold on longer to their graduate personnel, particularly in their administrative, staff, and research departments. In these areas, employment is relatively more stable because of the only indirect connection with production and sales fluctuations. The effects of technological developments, which meanwhile have also taken hold of office jobs, will probably have a lesser effect on highly qualified employees who are usually in charge of research, planning and managerial functions.

--Many of the regulations regarding professional training and employment required for many academic careers make it difficult for persons with a different educational background to penetrate those careers. This is especially true for independent academic professions (physicians, pharmacists, lawyers, notaries, tax advisers), teachers, and largely also for high-level employees of the national government, Länder, and municipalities.

#### The Unemployment Structure of University Graduates

As mentioned before, university graduates on the average continue to be less affected by unemployment than groups with different educational backgrounds. If these statements on averages are differentiated according to individual fields, it becomes clear that many of the aspects mentioned within the framework of employment structure are also reflected in the unemployment structure of university graduates. However, because of the



insufficient data base it is impossible to compute precisely the unemployment rate for individual fields.

Hardest hit by unemployment are university graduates in fields largely tailored for employment in the public service sector who, therefore, are particularly affected by the restrictive public personnel policy; teacher unemployment (and this only deals with unemployed teachers registered at the labor offices) has grown more than tenfold between 1975 and 1985 (from 2,600 to 29,000 persons). During the same period, the number of unemployed liberal arts majors grew by 700 percent, that of unemployed sociologists, political scientists, social pedagogues, and psychologists by almost 600 percent. The situation is similar for graduates of specialized colleges. The fields of social services (social work) are particularly hard hit; unemployment in those fields rose almost ninefold between 1975 and 1984 (from about 900 to more than 8,600 persons).

Meanwhile, however, unemployment of graduates has also spread to study fields more strongly oriented toward private industry. Between 1980 and 1983, unemployment among engineers, architects, natural scientists, lawyers and economists also rose distinctly. There are a number of reasons for this:

--Hesitant hiring policy of companies during longer-term uncertainty about incoming orders;

--Higher demands on qualification and job experience of applicants (youth, job experience, highest grades, additional knowledge of foreign languages, knowledge of electronic data processing, company-specific qualifications, for instance for engineers);

--Bankruptcies and company mergers which also lead to a reduction in administrative, managerial and research personnel.

During 1984 and 1985, a slight improvement of the job market for university graduates in industry occurred, due to economic factors. Although unemployment among engineers rose further in 1984, it was almost exclusively due to the growing number of unemployed architects and construction engineers. In natural science fields, the number of unemployed chemists, biologists and geologists also increased in 1984. The number of unemployed physicists remained about the same, that of mathematicians declined. Economists, business administration majors, and lawyers in particular showed a further increase in unemployment in 1984. It is doubtful that the slight improvement of the situation will become strong enough to cope with the growing number of graduates coming from the universities.

A further aspect of academic unemployment is the fact that women are hit to a greater extent by unemployment than men. This is particularly true because the majority of female university graduates are teachers. In 1975, 28 percent of all unemployed university graduates were women; in 1985, it

was 48 percent. As a comparison: of all employed university graduates, only 28 percent are women.

The length of unemployment for university graduates--as for other unemployment groups--has risen continually in recent years. It is higher for men (10.2 months) than for women (9.8 months)--an indicator that women withdraw from the labor market after a longish period of unemployment, or no longer report to the labor office.

#### Income and Qualification

If one compares the incomes of all wage and salary earners with different educational backgrounds for 1970 to 1982, the well-known ranking order is evident for the entire period: the higher the educational degree, the higher the income, also. The education-specific income spread in 1982 stretched from DM 1,275 (without training) to 2,962 (university degree). Therefore, a graduate of a scientific university on the average earns 2.3 times as much as the unskilled, and 1.8 times the total average income. The incomes of employees with a specialized college degree and those with a degree from a scientific university are relatively close.

Enlightening, also, is the comparison of income differences between men and women with equal education. For example, women university graduates earn only 64 percent of the income of equally qualified men. The difference in incomes is highest for men and women with specialized college degrees: in this case, women earn only 57 percent of the income of men. Among other things, this may also be due to the fact that men with such training are mostly engineers and business administrators, while women most frequently are social workers.

Based on the scale of the five educational levels, women over-all have to be qualified about two educational levels higher than men in order to come close to their income level.

#### Employment Prospects

The supply of graduates from universities and specialized colleges will increase considerably by the end of this century, mostly for demographic reasons. According to the prognoses of the conference of education ministers, the annual number of freshmen students will reach its highest level during 1985-87. In 1986/87, about 177,000 to 194,000 persons will begin their studies at a scientific university (1975: 123,000). In 1985/1986, the number of freshmen at specialized colleges will be between 77,000 to 83,000 (1975: 44,000). Transposed in time, this means that the number of university graduates will reach its peak in 1992/1993 with 137,000 to 149,000 graduates (1975: 85,000), and graduates of specialized colleges, during the period 1989/1990, with 63,000 to 68,000 graduates (1975: 32,000).



This development has the effect that by the year 2000, the number of employed university graduates will have almost doubled (2.2 million in 1980); these figures include job applicants with university degrees.

Future development will probably proceed under conditions different from the present, although in the past 20 years (1961-1982) the number of employed with university degrees doubled, also; but until now, the largest part of graduates was hired by the government. This can no longer be expected to the same extent in the coming years—at least not if task and working hour structures remain unchanged.

The restrictive financial and personnel policy of the government does not mean, however, that there is no longer any demand for further expansion of certain public services. This is especially true for the still under-supplied sectors such as social services, environmental protection, and consulting tasks. It rather seems that political willingness to finance those tasks has reached its limits at present. The financing means of communities in particular are limited and vary greatly.

As long as economic growth, and thus government revenues, is insufficient, and as long as different priorities are not set in economic, financial, regional and structural policies, employment expansion can be implemented only to a limited extent, perhaps through forms of flexible working hours, part-time employment, leaves of absence, or through lowering lifetime, yearly, or weekly working hours.

On the other hand, it is unrealistic to demand employment of future generations of graduates from private industry alone. But it must be studied to what extent private industry will be in a position to at least partially compensate for the declining demand for university graduates in the public sector through expansion of employment opportunities.

In comparison with the public service sector in a larger sense, where among employees, almost one-fifth have a university or college degree, in private industry not even one-twentieth hold a corresponding degree. Furthermore, the employment of graduates in private industry has increased only immaterially during the last decade. This could either mean that employment of university graduates in private industry has reached a saturation level, or else that companies so far have postponed hiring of university graduates, for example, because there were not sufficiently qualified applicants available.

Not only international comparisons, but also recent FRG studies support this second interpretation. Accordingly, the academic influx into private industry might increase in coming years, at least regarding graduates from fields "close to industry," i.e., from engineering, economics, law, and natural sciences. On the basis of polling 143 enterprises, the Institute of German Industry comes to the following conclusions:

1. "In the future, industry will employ university graduates, particularly in newly-created jobs." They list the following reasons:

- professionalization (i.e., also higher educational requirements) of strategic company sectors,
- development of a rising generation of leaders during past years (for instance, through trainee programs),
- creation of new jobs primarily through introduction of new communications technologies and new techniques of development and application.

2. "Practical experts are increasingly replaced by highly qualified graduates." The reasons for this are:

- companies have an accumulated need for university graduates, which can now be filled more easily because of the greater number of graduates;
- increased demands of many jobs require higher qualifications of employees;
- there is a lack of qualified practical experts; "top people", who formerly tried to get ahead through practical experience, now take the direct road via the university.

#### Employment of Women in the Scientific Sector

The proportion of female teachers and researchers at universities has changed only insignificantly in recent years. Within the universities, women are sought as additional workers, not as scientific employees and university teachers.

In 1984, women constituted

- 32.1 percent of scientific workers,
- 28.8 percent of lecturers,
- 24.4 percent of teachers for special tasks,
- 17.7 percent of scientific and artistic co-workers,
- 10.6 percent of (university) assistants,
- 5.2 percent of professors,
- 2.6 percent of professors of the C-4 category.

The strong under-representation of women is particularly reflected in technical and natural science education programs. Over-all, the share of female scientific personnel is only 13 percent, while women are relatively strongly represented in the service sector. While among professors, male colleagues occupy 95 percent of the positions, they "nevertheless" leave to women 24 percent of teaching positions for special tasks.

According to data of the Federal Education Ministry, the percentage of women going through the various levels of education steadily decreases at the university level: of 100 university freshmen, there are still 40 female graduates from a gymnasium; among 100 doctoral candidates, there are only 21 women; and among 100 newly qualified university teachers, the ratio of women is reduced to 7 percent. Of 100 graduates with a diploma, 30 are female.

It becomes ever more difficult for women to make a living in the field of science. A poll among doctoral candidates showed that it is much easier

for men than for women to finance their doctoral graduation through a university position. Simultaneously, men found full employment much more frequently, while the majority of women had to be satisfied with part-time jobs.

### Conclusions

The employment problems of university graduates will probably increase rather than decline during the coming years. Nevertheless, long-term prospects should not be overlooked because of short and medium term problems. The peak in number of students will be followed by a downswing in student numbers. Education, training, and application of qualification in the over-all labor market require a view based on the longer term. Society, therefore, must not only ask what demand there is for university graduates on the basis of pure mathematical computations at more or less unchanged work, career and activity structures, but also, how it can gain optimal use from the proffered qualifications. The long-term and worldwide trend for products and services, which also demand higher and innovative qualifications, is certain to continue. The FRG will have to continue to bank on this qualification trend in order not to lag behind international competition.

The individual confronted with employment problems in the coming years must accept that a university degree does not automatically lead to an attractive and privileged career position. To reach such positions, completion of a highly formal education alone is less and less sufficient.

Nonetheless: in view of the growing competition of equally well educated people, and in view of growing work demands, qualified completion of studies more and more becomes the basic precondition for career advancement. At the same time, waiver of a qualified education will also mean a simultaneous waiver of these opportunities.

In my opinion, improvement can be attained only through mutual efforts.

Employers can support the work-finding activities of the labor office by changing their attitudes.

This addresses in particular:

- a) rapid and comprehensive reporting of open positions,
- b) a description, as precise as possible, of qualification requirements,
- c) reporting applicants unwilling to work.

It would serve the social responsibility of employers if they would not only select the best among the applicants, but would also hire not exactly "suitable" applicants and make them "suitable" through company measures. This, at any rate, is better and socially more productive than to leave a position open for some time and possibly go into more overtime because of it. In general, a lesser bias against the unemployed would also be helpful, since it is frequently based on generalized estimations and only in rarer cases on concrete experience with the unemployed.

Prejudices still exist also in hiring girls for trade and technical jobs, be it for training or subsequent employment. Several model attempts have meanwhile proven the correctness of broadening the narrow job spectrum for women.

The labor office is in a dilemma. It becomes evident through the constantly worsening of the ratio of unemployed to job openings. Although until 1973 there were always more job openings than unemployed, with a short interruption during 1979-1980 of a ratio of 2 unemployed for every job opening, this ratio has dramatically deteriorated to 18 unemployed for every open position.

This highlight roughly characterizes the situation of the labor offices. This difficult situation applies to all qualification levels, from unskilled to skilled labor, and to university graduates.

One reason is the constant selection process in enterprises with the result that, on the average, 90 percent of those employed are ever better qualified, while on the average, the 10 percent unemployed have ever fewer, or the wrong qualifications (for instance, teachers). This situation also makes it more difficult to find job placements.

This also makes it clear that the fault does not lie with the labor offices or the job placement monopoly of the Federal Labor Office, but is due rather to long-lasting unemployment and company restructuring processes. For this reason, delegating job placement to third parties, possibly even on a gainful basis, cannot provide a meaningful solution.

#### Stronger Cooperation between Labor Office and Enterprise

In my opinion, improvement can be attained only through joint efforts by the labor offices and employers.

#### The tasks of the labor offices:

a) One can hardly overestimate the value of contacts between job placers and enterprises/personnel managers. This not only holds true for filling open jobs, but especially also for acquiring job openings and-- of particular importance this year--for increasing the number of trainee positions. In the past year of job placements, 1983-1984, more than 120,000 job contacts were carried out, which is a great increase compared to previous years.

b) To improve job placements, it is important to be more imaginative, for example in semi-open job placements and other job placement services. Another example which points in this direction is the placement of television screens in post offices, listing job offers.

c) Of growing importance is the decentralized use of electronic data processing--CoArb, COMPAS--for rapid and comprehensive information about

job offers and applicants. Although the recording of applicants' data is still problematical at present, electronic data processing will increasingly improve the chances for job placements, particularly because of greater market transparency.

d) The Federal Labor Office makes its instruments available to presently unemployed university graduates, in particular extended training and retraining measures (FuU) and job placement services. In 1985, extended training and retraining was begun for 19,400 university graduates.

The existing possibilities of the Federal Labor Office could be improved if the following proposal by our own administrations and the Federal Labor Office could be realized: In particular for women, soldiers with short-term enlistment, and the unemployed with schooling or university training, after a longish interruption of employment it is so far not possible to support continued professional training through a maintenance grant. An appropriate change in the law would ease the transition to, or re-entry into, gainful employment.

In 1985, about 6,000 unemployed university graduates (9 percent) were able to find temporary employment through job placement measures. The content of these measures is of particular importance for this group of people. The sector of environmental protection increasingly offers suitable employment for university graduates.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

## PRESIDENTIAL RACE, NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES AT PARTY CONGRESSES

Christian Party Woos Center

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Jun 86 p 3

[Article by Jouni Tervo: "Christian League Congress Began in Turku, Almgren Ready To Guide Party Into Government"]

[Text] Turku--The Finnish Christian League, which has convened its party congress in Turku, is aiming at closer cooperation with the Center Party in the future.

In his policy report Chairman Esko Almgren emphasized that the chairmen of the centrist parties have agreed to recommend to their respective memberships a joint appearance in government negotiations after the parliamentary elections next spring.

In Almgren's opinion, "from the very beginning already we have prepared ourselves for the possibility that the SKL [Finnish Christian League], since it is a political party, can also be represented in the country's government.

The Christians would rather find a prime minister from some non-socialist party if the socialist parties should make up a majority in the next parliament.

"Real parliamentarianism must be observed in the country and all parties should in principle be placed in the same position in forming a government," stated Almgren.

According to Almgren, the Christians will strive for the greatest possible cooperation with the Center Party, the RKP [Swedish People's Party] and the LKP [Liberal People's Party] in the elections. In practice this will mean the conclusion of election alliances in 11 election districts.

In the previous parliamentary elections in 1983 the Christians rejected their previous partner in cooperation, the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], and hastened to join with the Center Party and the LKP. The SMP and the Center Party drew the longest straw in the elections. The Christians lost seven of their 10 seats in parliament. The LKP did not win one single seat.



## Avoiding Vayrynen

In spite of Center Party sympathies, Almgren carefully avoided endorsing Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen's presidential candidacy. According to Almgren, all of the Christian League's efforts will be concentrated on the parliamentary elections and only then will the time be right to talk about presidential candidates.

The party congress approved two changes in regulations, of which one concerned the nomination of a presidential candidate. The change, which was implemented without a vote, gives the 60-member party council the responsibility and power to nominate a candidate.

The other change introduced a 2-year interval between party congresses. The transition to the new system of scheduling congresses will be made after the summer.

## Rank and File Concerned About Environmental Protection

The poor showing in the previous elections placed Almgren's position in the party leadership in doubt for a time, but now the situation has stabilized. Almgren, who will be reelected as chairman on Saturday, did not hear one single critical speech in the general discussion. Two representatives, on the other hand, praised the stand of the party leadership on cooperation with the political center.

Olavi Ronkainen, chairman of the Christian League's parliamentary group, was, on the whole, restrained in his familiar basic assessments. This time Ronkainen's point of criticism struck most sharply at the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the trade union movement.

In Ronkainen's opinion, President Mauno Koivisto walked over parliament in the dispute regarding the observance of holy days at the request of Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa and the wishes of the trade union movement.

"The highest bishop of the Church did not want to honor the traditions of the Church any more than of the Bible," regretted Ronkainen.

The rank and file, who have become enchanted with the ideals of the Greens, expressed such deep concern for the protection of the environment in their speeches that the old standard subjects of abortion, marital relations, and alcohol were almost to become completely overshadowed by it.

The speakers expressed the most concern about nuclear power, from which there is a desire to make a more definite break. In the environmental policy statement, which will be debated on Saturday, it is proposed that plans for a fifth nuclear power plant be abandoned.

The most severe critics, however, would be ready to dismantle the four nuclear power plants already in operation. The proposal received definite support in the hall.

23 July 1986

## Christian Party Revolt Quashed

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Jun 86 p 6

[Article Jouni Tervo: "An Old Position in Christian League's Chairmanship Election, Ronkainen Appeared Momentarily As Almgren's Opposing Candidate"]

[Text] Turku--Policy differences in the Christian League came surprisingly to the surface in the chairmanship elections of the party congress in Turku.

The election of Esko Almgren that has been assumed to be unanimous received a hairline crack when Viljo Heiskanen, a representative from the district of Northern Karelia, proposed Olavi Ronkainen, chairman of the parliament group, as party chairman also.

Representative Tapio Bragge's wish that "the party's anti-pornography policy and expert-politician policy be merged into one indivisible policy" was also unfulfilled.

In Viljo Heiskanen's opinion, the Christian League cannot afford another successive election defeat. For this reason, Ronkainen, to whom the rank and file feels an attraction, should be elected chairman.

Ronkainen clearly declined the candidacy, but at the same time began preparations for next summer's party chairmanship race.

"I have understood that when the party elects a chairman, it also chooses a policy line. There was an opportunity to change the chairman at the last party congress, perhaps also in the next, but not now. I decline the candidacy," stated Ronkainen.

After Ronkainen's announcement, Almgren was unanimously elected the first chairman of the party without any opposing candidates. Marjatta Laakko, 47, a leading manager from Lappeenranta, also received the rank and file's blessing as second chairwoman.

However, it became necessary to vote for the third chairman inasmuch as Antti Jarva is retiring.

The Christian Youth Organizations stood behind its candidate, Klaus Rytöhöngä, until the end even though the election committee had elected Toimi Kankaanniemi, 36, as a candidate by a vote of 14 to 1.

Kankaanniemi received 287 votes against Rytöhöngä's 83 votes. Five representatives abstained.

## Projected Platform Received Support

Except for the elections, those attending the congress went along with all the proposals of the leadership on Saturday. The operational plan of principles

compiled by Party Secretary Jouko Jaaskelainen received almost unqualified approval.

"The plan is so good that if all parties were to implement it, Finland would be a splendid place to live," assured Seija Opas, among others.

In the operational plan the Christian League announces that its objective is to reduce taxes by implementing a system of indirect taxation. The party would eliminate social security payments for youth under the age of 23 so that social expenditures for businesses could be reduced.

In addition, a desire is expressed in the program to reduce alcohol consumption at an annual rate of 5 percent, accelerate the experiment of free communities, and ban violent and pornographic videos.

Families would be supported by increasing child subsidies and tying them to an index. The party has declared a health care payment system as its primary goal. The position of the elderly would be improved by guaranteeing equal support to privately operated homes for the elderly.

Abraham's Covenant Instead of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Pact

A dispirited debate managed to surface only a couple times. Chairman Almgren found himself in an annoying situation in interpreting Karl-Gustav Klemet's Swedish-language speech.

Klemet expressed the hope that Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen would better understand the history of Israel the next time he travels to that country and not fraternize too much with the Arabs.

In Klemet's opinion, Finland should "support Abraham's covenant more than the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact.

"Do not fear, Finland, Israel is behind you," Almgren found himself saying in Finnish on the speaker's rostrum.

The Christian League adopted a group of resolutions at the conclusion of the congress. In them it proposed, among other things, the abandonment of a fifth nuclear power plant, farm support, more effective control of commercial entertainment, and the implementation of a family tax.

The Christian League will hold its next party congress next summer probably in Joensuu. After that, the interval between party congresses will be 2 years.

On Sunday those attending the congress of the Christian League will leave politicking aside and enjoy a day of rest. The plan is to visit Naantali and Turku's cathedral church.

## Swedish Party Defers President's Decision

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Jun 86 p 9

[Article by Martti Backman: "All Government Bases Suitable for Swedish People's Party"]

[Text] Oravainen--Chairman Cristoffer Taxell of the Swedish People's Party is leaving all the doors open for a new government to be formed after the parliamentary elections.

"We are open to various government alternatives, to the current type of government as well as to any other kind," he declared and stated that the RKP will continue to strive to sit at such tables where decisions will be made.

Taxell, who opened the Swedish People's Party congress in Oravainen in Ostrobothnia, thought that the reduced influence of the left wing has been the primary factor in increasing government alternatives.

"The possibilities for a bourgeois government -- or at least a government in which there will be a greater bourgeois representation -- will presumably be greater after the elections than they have been for a long time."

Even though Taxell saw no reason to link next year's parliamentary elections to the 1968 presidential elections, he admitted that the presidential elections may affect the formation of a government. The link is, however, more tactical than actual in his opinion.

### Presidential Decision Next Summer

Taxell saw no need to make any decisions on the party's presidential candidate before next summer's party congress. Taxell thought that the election method can still affect the RKP's decision.

According to Taxell, the party must adopt as its premise demands which would be presented to the country's president in good times as well as bad. In addition, the Swedish-speaking people must find a policy line around which the party can be gathered.

Taxell considers that the last few years, in particular, have emphasized the president's position as a foreign policy leader at the expense of domestic policy initiative.

"If it is believed that this policy will continue, the direct ideological significance of the presidential elections will decrease," he said.

Taxell was interpreted as cautiously expressing his readiness, if necessary, to place himself ideologically behind a presidential candidate from the opposing or so-called socialist camp also.

In his opening speech Taxell strongly rejected demands to privatize social services.

"If the intent is to base the right to social security on income, place of residence, or language, the Swedish People's Party cannot support such a reform. Here if anywhere it is a question of justice," said Taxell in referring to the party's 80th anniversary slogan, "Freedom and Justice".

Indeed, he pointed out that private initiative in the area of health care also must not be stifled since even the public sector needs competition.

#### Astonishment Expressed At Soccer War

MP Ole Norrback, chairman of the RKP's parliamentary group, was astonished by the fuss raised in the evening papers regarding the Swedish-language reporting of the soccer games. "What is even more serious is that the right to Swedish-language television programming was made questionable."

The first day's debate of the 2-day congress was devoted to energy policy.

Only 2 years ago at the Swedish People's Party congress held in Mustasaari every other speaker expressed horror at the destructive effects of acid rain to the environment.

Now the acid rain caused by the burning of coal was completely forgotten and radioactive iodine rain replaced it as the uppermost concern of Finland's Swedes.

The party's governing body had prepared for approval by the congress an energy policy stand according to which a decision on the construction of a new nuclear power plant will be postponed for 10 years.

According to the stand, the growing need for electricity is to be satisfied by conserving energy and by promoting the dispersed production of electricity as well as by building additional coal-fired power plants.

This policy of the party's governing body did not seem to go far enough especially for the younger representatives to the congress. Immediately at the beginning of the congress a dozen young people came forward to propose even the closure of our existing nuclear power plants. It is possible that a vote will have to be taken on a solution to the conflict between a less stringent and tougher policy line today on Sunday.

#### Dilemma Unresolved After Greens' Congress

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Jun 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Greens' Problem"]

[Text] ... Green movement has two Members of Parliament, and its popularity is increasing according to the predictions. But the Greens who assembled in Tampere were still not able to resolve whether the meteoric fate of a small party will be part of the movement or whether the Greens will continue to represent idealism, which strives to change the behavior of the decision-makers



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by the force of knowledge and ideas and not by the customary means of political power.

The accomplishment of such a solution for a one-issue movement is difficult. To refrain from declaring itself a movement, which measures its achievements by the Green solutions of parties and decision-makers, is too late. Whether or not the movement organizes itself into a party, the power of its idealism will in any event be measured on the basis of its popularity. If its popularity falls off, it is assumed that the idealism of the Greens will also fade proportionately. On the other hand, it is considered that the credit for the greening of other parties be given to them.

The Green movement has benefited and profited from the course of events and not from the parliamentary actions of its MP's. With a larger group the Greens could influence decisions in close votes. But in order to obtain serious-minded support in the future, a consistent, unified, and overall political ability to criticize and make decisions in addition to idealistic enthusiasm will be required of the Green MP's. An individual in a special position of responsibility must rise above the usual role of a rank-and-file MP.

Thus it is justifiable to say that the degree or form of organization among the Greens will not resolve their essential problem or the question of the quality of their representatives. A seat in parliament will, indeed, guarantee publicity in the media and the group's economic means and opportunities to influence decisions, but they are still not sufficient for the Greens' goals. If an idealistic intelligentsia is needed for work in the field, there is even a greater need for such in the Greens' parliamentary group. Special tasks also presuppose a special quality in the most positive sense of the word.

#### Paper Summarizes Congresses' Results

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Jun 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Discord in Center Coexistence"]

[Text] Over the weekend Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen continued his criticism of the left wing and turned to flattery of the right wing. At the same time he declared with style that the center is ready to cooperate with the right wing as well as the left wing.

Also the small parties included in the political center explained their feelings at party congresses over the weekend. Centrist cooperation turned out to be a relatively loose frame of reference at these congresses. Each party examined the near future primarily from their own premises. A prudent cautiousness characterized their positions concerning the presidential elections, in particular.

The LKP, which has become independent again, will continue to need the necessary support and appeal of centrist cooperation. Its fate will be decisively determined in the next parliamentary elections. They will determine whether



POLITICAL

FINLAND

DETAILS, REACTION ON EXPULSION OF MINORITY MP'S FROM SKDL.

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Jun 86 p 10

[Article: "Finnish Communist Party Majority Expelled Minority"]

[Text] "There is not enough room for the representatives of two parties in one parliamentary group."

According to Veikko Saarto, chairman of the SKDL's [Finnish People's Democratic League's] parliamentary group, the expulsion of the minority from the group became unavoidable since the Taistoites [Stalinists] established the Committee of SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Organizations parallel to the SKP in Tampere in April.

"There cannot be representatives of two parties in the same parliamentary group," stated Saarto on Thursday in parliament soon after the meeting to expel the minority.

According to Saarto, the policies of the SKDL's parliamentary group will not really change even though only majority Communists now belong to it. According to him, its work will be based on left-wing cooperation as well as on cooperation between the left wing and the center.

"There is no reason to begin attacking those who have now been expelled. I hope that we will be able to work together with them in as many issues as possible," stated Saarto only five minutes after having shown the minority members the door.

Only Item On Agenda

The expulsion of the minority members was the only item on the agenda of Thursday's meeting of the SKDL's group, and no time was wasted in accomplishing it. The decision was made in about 20 minutes.

Saarto stated at the beginning of the meeting that the minority MP's had given a written answer stating that they will continue to work in the new party established parallel to the SKP contrary to the demand of the majority to disassociate themselves from parallel activities.

According to Saarto, the SKDL's group had no other alternative except to expel the MP's from the SKDL's parliamentary group.

Minority member Ensio Laine denied the accusations of parallel activities at the meeting. This, however, caused majority members Juhani Vahakangas and Osmo Vepsäläinen to accuse Laine of hypocrisy.

The expulsion decision came about by a vote of 16 to 10, majority member Anna-Liisa Jokinen being absent due to a trip to England.

After the decision, minority member and veteran MP Irma Rosnell stated that she had seen many successes in the work of the SKDL's group during her long parliamentary career. "Today, however, is black Thursday in the history of the workers' movement," said Rosnell as the minority members left the meeting room after the decision to hold an organizational meeting of their own group.

In order that the representatives of the press, who had crowded into the parliament building, would not have exited without hearing all the sources of information, an editor of TIEDONANTAJA who was present at Saarto's press conference announced in a loud voice that the Taistoites would hold their own press conference in an hour.

At that time Ensio Laine appeared before the cameras as chairman of the new Democratic Alternative Parliamentary Group. The Democratic Alternative is the election party established by the minority Communists.

MP's Mikko Kuoppa and Irma Rosnell, who were elected to the faction's committee, sat next to Laine.

"We have been expelled since the intent is to turn the policies of the SKDL's parliamentary group to the right," stated Laine.

According to him, the objective of the majority is to subordinate the group's policies to the government game.

The policy line of the Democratic Alternative is also clear in his opinion: "We will continue a leftist and radical policy together with the masses."

#### Cooperation Sought

According to Rosnell, there is no intent, however to embark upon a path of building conflicts, but left-wing cooperation with majority members is also possible in the future.

The first practical example of cooperation between the two factions will come about on Friday when the Communists vote for a resolution of censure in parliament regarding the transactions of Taistoite Esko-Juhani Tennila's Kemi Company.

At their own press conference the minority members once again denied that they have deviated from the SKP's policy line. According to Laine, Thursday's expulsion, however, sealed the fact that there are no longer any possibilities of joint election alliances with the SKDL.

He would not consent to predicting the size of the Democratic Alternative's parliamentary group after the elections. "We will, however, field candidates in every election district," he announced.

Of the expelled MP's, Seppo Toiviainen is from the Helsinki Election District, Pirkko Turpeinen and Marja-Liisa Loyttyjarvi are from Uusimaa, Mikko Kuoppa and Marjatta Stenius-Kaukonen are from the Northern Election District of Hame, Matti Kautto is from the Southern Election District of Hame, Irma Rosnell is from the Northern Election District of Turku, Sten Soderstrom is from Vaasa, Ensio Laine is from the Southern Election District of Turku, and Esko-Juhani Tennila is from the Lapland Election District. The minority faction does not have any MP's from the election districts of Kymi, Mikkeli, Kuopio, Keski-Suomi [Central Finland], or Northern Karelia.

The conjectures abounding around parliament regarding the disposition of the new parliamentary group in the committee rooms as well as in the chamber itself did not seem to interest the minority members on Thursday. "We will consult the parliament's administrative organs in these technical questions next week," said Laine.

The minority group's space will probably be separated from the present room occupied by the SKDL's group with a dividing wall. The other alternative would be to move the Greens next door to the majority faction and give the Greens' space to the Democratic Alternative's parliamentary group.

As a result of this expulsion, the SKDL's group will lose the minority MPs' office appropriations of approximately 30,000 markkaa per month for the remainder of the election term.

Minority Member Marjatta Stenius: "This Is Black Thursday"

Unlike the other Taistoites MP Marjatta Stenius-Kaukonen from Tampere remained silent at the press conference, at which the announcement of the just organized Democratic Alternative's parliamentary group was made.

In her opinion, the expulsion of the minority members has created a certain funereal atmosphere. "Black Thursday is an appropriate name," she thinks.

In Stenius-Kaukonen's opinion, it is very clear that the policies of the SKDL's group are becoming more right-wing. "Otherwise, there would have been no reason to expel us," she argues.

She denies that the group has, practically speaking, been divided for years already. "I have been in parliament for 11 years and the last 3 years have been the least divisive -- indeed, this has been sought as a justification for this expulsion," she says.

The dissolution of the group will dominate the conversations of the majority as well as the minority over the weekend. "However, I urge everyone to work

POLITICAL

FINLAND

BRIEFS

SKDL SEEKS TIES WITH GREENS--The executive board of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] proposed on Wednesday the buildup of cooperation with Greens and other new political movements. According to the executive board, talks on cooperation could serve as the initial impetus for the creation of a new front for social change. The subjects of such talks, according to the SKDL executive board's proposal, could be the relationship between society and nature, the attitude toward economic growth, the question of self-government, and matters connected with the realization of equality. According to the SKDL proposal, the goal would be to create a dialogue or a common forum for giving shape to a new kind of political cooperation. The executive board also condemned the transfer of Valmet's shipyard industry to the private sector's Wartsila and called for the socialization of commercial banks. In the executive board's view, a law should immediately be passed which makes the banking establishment responsible for the social consequences of its investment decisions. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Jun 86 p 10] 12327

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

FRANCE-LIBERTES PROJECTS IN EL SALVADOR, ARGENTINA, AFRICA

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jun 86 p 9

[Television interview with Danielle Mitterrand by Christiane Chombeau]

[Text] In appearing on the French TV program "7 sur 7" on Sunday, 4 May, Mrs Danielle Mitterrand broke through the reserve that she had maintained until now. In fact, the wife of the president of the Republic insisted on personally presenting the France-Libertes Foundation that she created.

[Question] Why a France-Libertes Foundation (Footnote 1) (Fondation France-Libertes, Danielle Mitterrand, 161, boulevard Haussmann, 75008 Paris. Tel.: 42-89-81-81.) when there are already so many organizations in France?

[Answer] I wanted to create a solid structure that would allow us--myself and the team of young people working with me--to continue to operate on a daily basis even after I leave the Elysee. A foundation ensures permanence and offers many more opportunities than an association. In short, though there are organizations that denounce human rights violations, our goal is to help and support the projects of those who fight for the emergence and strengthening of individual and collective freedoms throughout the world...

[Question] What will the limits of your sphere of activity be?

[Answer] Physical, material... for I do not pretend to be able to change the world, even if one can always dream of a planet on which people would love one another.

[Question] Will the foundation intervene in any country governed by any kind of political regime?

[Answer] What is already being done with our associations? (Footnote 2) (Association du 21 juin (Association of 21 June); La France avec vous (France with you); Cause commune (Common Cause)). In Afghanistan, as in El Salvador, we considered it necessary to teach children deprived of classroom instruction how to read and write, no matter how this situation came about. We will intervene every time we feel that human rights are being trampled, the right to come and go, to speak, to broadcast, to make inquiries.

[Question] What are the projects that you hope to further right away?



[Answer] Among all those that we want to support, the first concerns the village of Tenancingo in El Salvador, a country where two armies of equal strength are clashing without anyone really knowing peace can be achieved by means of force alone. The archdiocese convinced all combatants to agree that neither army would enter Tenancingo, which will become a village of peace. Its inhabitants have already begun to rebuild the houses and, for our part, we hope to finance the reconstruction of the school and perhaps even build a hospital.

The second project will support the mothers and grandmothers in Argentina in their search for traces of family members who disappeared under the dictatorship. We have already provided them with a computer to record all the information concerning those who disappeared and their families.

At present, these women hope to go further. Many children were born in captivity or were raised during that troubled time. Some were adopted by those who tortured their parents... One day they will want to know who their natural parents are. Thus these mothers and grandmothers of La Plaza de Mayo had the idea of creating a sort of genetic library to record all the genetic information on the families torn apart in this way. The researchers who are helping them need reagents and freezers.

The third project consists in creating a research institute in South Africa where Blacks and Whites will meet to reflect on a multiracial society. It will be called IPADAS: Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa. It is a wonderful project that was presented by one of our administrators, the Afrikaaner writer Breyten Breytenbach.

[Question] Would you agree to meet with Mr Botha?

[Answer] If I saw a reason for it, why not? But at the present time I do not see how such a meeting could be constructive.

[Question] Some people see in the creation of the foundation and your appearance on television a campaign orchestrated on the highest level to occupy center stage during a politically delicate period...

[Answer] In my position I could have created this foundation a long time ago to the best advantage of the actions that I'm undertaking. But I wasn't ready. I wanted to proceed by stages, to narrowly define my sphere of activity before launching the foundation.

[Question] Do you speak to Mr Mitterrand about your projects?

[Answer] You know, I am an open book. When I have a passion, an enthusiasm for something, you've no need to ask me to speak about it... I don't know how to be secretive and this is sometimes a handicap.

[Question] Do you ask for his opinion before acting?

[Answer] There are things that I feel myself. It is your own conscience that tells you when there is a need for discretion and when there is a risk of hampering a negotiation...

"Francois Often Jokes About It"

[Question] Like with the hostages in Lebanon?

[Answer] Yes, I cannot bear this technique of hostage-taking and if one day someone tells me I can be useful I won't hesitate. But for now we must have confidence in those who are negotiating at the highest level. The slightest blunder can be fatal... And speaking of limits to my intervention, I see another one here: that dictated by efficacy.

[Question] Could you today, considering your experience, define the role of a wife of the president of the Republic?

[Answer] Being a president's wife is not a function and it is difficult not "to be"... It is totally personalized role... As for me, I want to go on being what I have always been, with my convictions and my way of doing things.

[Question] You have been presented as a supermediator!

[Answer] No, there is already one of those, and that is enough. A mediator places two parties across from one another to reach an agreement, whereas I try to convince one of the two parties and to bring him to the conclusion that I believe is right.

[Question] Apparently you recently did just that with King Hassan II of Morocco.

[Answer] That's for the two interested parties to discuss and not me, that could compromise future actions.

[Question] All right then, let's say more particularly that you have succeeded in enabling a political prisoner, Mr Abraham Serfaty, to get married while in prison.

[Answer] You will understand if I prefer not to discuss it.

[Question] You have refused several times to accompany Mr Mitterrand on official trips...

[Answer] Yes, that was when the currency card (Footnote 3) (A card from the bank presented at customs indicating how much money was being taken out of the country) was instituted... The French reacted very negatively to that decision. I was profoundly shocked by that lack of patriotism... Maybe that was ridiculous, but that's how I am. Francois often makes jokes about it. When I get hold of an idea I forge ahead and nothing can make me change my mind.

[Question] What do you say when people nickname you "la passionaria"?

[Answer] I don't like that image that is usually painted in a pejorative way of a woman with convictions. It's true, I have passions and I try to get people to share them, but those who know me know that I display tolerance and understanding.

[Answer] Among all those that we want to support, the first concerns the village of Tenancingo in El Salvador, a country where two armies of equal strength are clashing without anyone really knowing peace can be achieved by means of force alone. The archdiocese convinced all combatants to agree that neither army would enter Tenancingo, which will become a village of peace. Its inhabitants have already begun to rebuild the houses and, for our part, we hope to finance the reconstruction of the school and perhaps even build a hospital.

The second project will support the mothers and grandmothers in Argentina in their search for traces of family members who disappeared under the dictatorship. We have already provided them with a computer to record all the information concerning those who disappeared and their families.

At present, these women hope to go further. Many children were born in captivity or were raised during that troubled time. Some were adopted by those who tortured their parents... One day they will want to know who their natural parents are. Thus these mothers and grandmothers of La Plaza de Mayo had the idea of creating a sort of genetic library to record all the genetic information on the families torn apart in this way. The researchers who are helping them need reagents and freezers.

The third project consists in creating a research institute in South Africa where Blacks and Whites will meet to reflect on a multiracial society. It will be called IPADAS: Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa. It is a wonderful project that was presented by one of our administrators, the Afrikaaner writer Breyten Breytenbach.

[Question] Would you agree to meet with Mr Botha?

[Answer] If I saw a reason for it, why not? But at the present time I do not see how such a meeting could be constructive.

[Question] Some people see in the creation of the foundation and your appearance on television a campaign orchestrated on the highest level to occupy center stage during a politically delicate period...

[Answer] In my position I could have created this foundation a long time ago to the best advantage of the actions that I'm undertaking. But I wasn't ready. I wanted to proceed by stages, to narrowly define my sphere of activity before launching the foundation.

[Question] Do you speak to Mr Mitterrand about your projects?

[Answer] You know, I am an open book. When I have a passion, an enthusiasm for something, you've no need to ask me to speak about it... I don't know how to be secretive and this is sometimes a handicap.

[Question] Do you ask for his opinion before acting?

[Answer] There are things that I feel myself. It is your own conscience that tells you when there is a need for discretion and when there is a risk of hampering a negotiation...

[Question] And when you are described as the one in the Mitterrand household who is steering a course back to the left?

[Answer] I don't have to steer back to the left!

[Question] Not even at this moment?

[Answer] (Hearty laughter).

13233/5915

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

# MITTERRAND SEES NEW CALEDONIAN DJIBAOU, NOT UKEIWE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 14-15 Jun 86 p 5

[Article by Jacques-Maurice Cler]

[Text] On his way back from a trip to Paris Senator Dick Ukeiwe, president of the Congress of New Caledonia, arrived in Noumea on 13 June, accompanied by Pierre Frogier, president of the Southern Region. President Ukeiwe did not succeed in meeting with President Mitterrand, as he had sought to do.

Following the meeting which President Mitterrand had on 15 May with three leaders of the minority group in favor of independence for New Caledonia, Djibaou, Yewaine, and Joredie, the loyalist majority group [those in favor of the continued association of New Caledonia with France] had wanted, in turn, to have its views heard. With this in mind the representatives of the majority group had sent a request for an appointment with the president of France in the following terms: "You have shown your interest in questions concerning the territory of New Caledonia and its independence by agreeing to receive representatives of groups in favor of independence on 15 May 1986. We would also wish to have you hear the elected representatives of New Caledonia, including the president of the Territorial Congress and the president of the Southern Region. In this way the representatives of the broad majority of the Caledonian people could inform you of the new policy which they would like to see followed by France in New Caledonia."

President Ukeise expressed his disappointment simply but seriously, when he said: "A proposed date was mentioned: between 28 May and 2 June. The president of France did not agree to receive us, although he had received the supporters of independence. Francois Mitterrand is now a party leader more than he is the president of all of the French people, contrary to what he told us. I am very disappointed."

However, the trip made by the elected representatives of the people who are loyal to France was not without value. Pierre Frogier, president of the Southern Region (former minister of economy and finance under the Ukeiwe Government at the time of the events of 1984-85), reported on the representations his group made to various ministries in Paris and the reception which they received, particularly from Madelin, in the Ministry of Industry; Douffiagues, in the Ministry of Transport; and Monory, in the Ministry of National Education. Bernard Pons, minister of overseas

departments and territories, confirmed the immediate allocation to New Caledonia of a special fund amounting to 9.5 billion CFP [French Community of the Pacific] francs (about 510 million French francs), earmarked for economic recovery, relief for the victims of natural disasters, and making up for shortfalls in the 1985 budget.

On the other hand the Territorial Congress, which met on 13 June, passed a resolution in support of the draft bill prepared by Francois Leotard on the freedom of audiovisual communications. The resolution passed by a vote of 26 (all loyalists) in favor, and one against (Nadoish Naisseline of the LKS, the "Kanak Socialist Liberation" party). The FLNKS [Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front] abstained on the measure.

#### Radio Broadcasting Under Socialist Control

On the occasion of the debate on the Leotard measure Harold Martin, speaking on behalf of the RPCR, denounced what he called "the total control exercised by the socialist government on communications. Radio and television broadcasts were used to attempt to impose a policy which a large majority of the people rejected. We can only express our pleasure over the disappearance of the High Authority [body supervising audiovisual communications in France], which served no useful purpose, and the establishment of a National Council of Communications and Freedoms. We do not wish to place RFO [Overseas French Radio Service] on trial on this occasion. (Footnote 1) (Fred Jouhaux, the director for New Caledonia of Radio-France-Outremer, was awarded the National Order of Merit on 2 June and appointed director of RFO in French Polynesia in Tahiti.) However, I would like to mention some examples to recall the kind of continually provocative activity which has been going on since 1981. The socialists exercised the heaviest kind of pressure which a public service organization has ever known. Journalists were assigned to New Caledonia on a temporary basis for a period from 3 to 6 months, whereas the tour of duty is normally 3 or 4 years. Local journalists were suspended when they did not follow the official line. The socialists engaged in direct intervention against the press, not to mention the disgraceful misuse of the air waves by poor Edgar Pisani. We were able to measure the rejection of the programs of the state radio service by the very high listener ratings of Radio Blue Rhythm." (Footnote 2) (Radio Blue Rhythm is a local, privately-owned radio station which supports the loyalists. The station was called "The Voice of Independence" during the events of 1985. Its manager is Christian Prost.)

Territorial Deputy Jacques Lafleur, who recently fell seriously ill during his visit to metropolitan France, is still hospitalized in Paris.

High Commissioner Fernand Wibaux left Noumea on 13 June on an official trip to Paris. He is expected back in New Caledonia in 1 week.

5170  
CSO: 3519/201

POLITICAL

FRANCE

**FLNKS DEMONSTRATIONS INCREASE TENSION IN NEW CALEDONIA**

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by Frederic Bobin]

[Text] Noumea--Tension has sharply increased in New Caledonia with the opening on 19 June of the trial in Noumea of 17 persons charged with the shooting incident on 10 June 1983 involving the Koinde tribe (in the Commune of La Foa) which took the lives of two police officers. Concerned that new troubles would break out, on 18 June the Office of the High Commissioner issued an order prohibiting any demonstrations in the Communes of Noumea and La Foa.

In effect, the political climate has worsened since 16 June, following the announcement by the FLNKS [Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front] of "peaceful" demonstrations throughout New Caledonia in order "to support the persons arrested in Koinde" and "to denounce the militarization of Kanakia" [FLNKS name for New Caledonia]

The reaction of the anti-independence extreme Right was immediate. The Patriotic Action Committees (CAP), led by Justin Guillemard, the elected representative of the RPCR for the Central Region, immediately called for a counter-demonstration, while the Caledonian Front [FC] invited its members "to watch events closely, keeping ready for any orders."

Having learned from the events of 8 May 1985, the encounter between demonstrators and counter-demonstrators which turned into a brawl, the authorities therefore decided to run no further risks.

Noumea will be completely patrolled throughout 19 June by a substantial detachment of the security forces with the mission of breaking up any unlawful assembly.

For its part the FLNKS announced on 18 June that it would not accept the order outlawing demonstrations. Its members are considering entering the courtroom in small groups, while a sit-in demonstration might take place outside the court. If such orders to its followers continue in effect, some incidents are to be expected.

The determination displayed by the supporters of independence in this matter reflects the importance of the symbol which this trial in Koinde has in their

eyes. Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the president of the FLNKS, commented recently: "This is a trial of the Kanak people. It is a particularly good example of a colonialist trial." Along with other pro-independence leaders, he will be called on as a character witness in the trial. This trial already promises to be an unprecedented event in the annals of the New Caledonian courts. There will be 3 or 4 days of arguments, the presence of the principal persons involved at the time, recalled from metropolitan France for this occasion (leaders of the Gendarmerie and officials of the Office of the High Commissioner), as well as Attorneys Tubiana and De Felice, of the Paris bar, and Attorneys Roux and Ottan, of the Montpellier bar, who will join the group of lawyers assisting the accused.

Among the accused will be 17 Melanesians of the Koinde tribe, an isolated tribe in the mountains 25 kilometers from the town of La Foa. 16 among them have already been provisionally released from detention. They are charged with an attempt at premeditated murder. Sylvestre Nemoare, the only one of the accused still being held in Camp Est prison in Noumea, has been charged with premeditated murder.

The events involved in the trial took place 3 1/2 years ago, in the course of a Gendarmerie operation aimed at collecting equipment belonging to Barbou, a logging contractor, which was being held by the Koinde tribe. In effect, at the time of the incident a dispute had been going on between Barbou and members of the tribe for the previous 5 years. The tribesmen were dissatisfied with the pollution of their river due to landslides and debris falling into the river as a result of logging operations. The Melanesians demanded the payment of compensation and, in exchange for their agreement that Barbou might continue his logging operations, they demanded that the land involved be terraced and that the river be channeled between embankments.

About 5 years of negotiations and discussions took place until a November day in 1982 when the Koinde tribe, who believed that they were being flooded out, decided to prevent the equipment belonging to Barbou from being operated, as they intended to use their possession of the equipment as a bargaining lever to obtain concessions. Emotions ran high among the European community in La Foa, who immediately demanded that the government authorities intervene. The principle of a "mailed fist" operation was decided on by Jacques Roynette, the socialist high commissioner at the time who had recently arrived in the territory. This operation led to the incident. Clashes broke out between the Melanesians and the gendarmes, when the equipment was being picked up. Gendarmes Jacques Morice and Eric Galardon were mortally wounded by gunshots. Was this a premeditated ambush? The defense will state that the shots were fired after the police had previously fired tear gas, thereby creating a real panic within a tribe which was unfamiliar with this kind of weapon.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

**SURPRISES, SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT ELECTIONS ANALYZED**

Paris ETUDES in French Jun 86 pp 765-774

[Article by Rene Remond: "The 16 March Elections"]

[Text] Any election, whatever the object of it may be, resembles a scientific experiment. Not only because of the uncertainty that applies to its result up until the last moment, like the success of an experiment, but because of the many messages the abundance of which a first reading is very far from exhausting. When the Giotto probe encountered Halley's Comet, all the important scientists who provided us with live commentary underlined the fact that it would take months to interpret all the data that reached them. The same is true of elections: Aside from their immediately apparent lessons, which chiefly involve the balance of power among the parties, the distribution of mandates and the vesting of power, they provide a profusion of information on the climate of public opinion, the public's frame of mind, citizens' likes or dislikes and the profound changes in the electorate. This is all the more so if, as was the case last 16 March, the vote pairs two elections. It was in fact not the slight originality of the event, but the simultaneity of elections for the renewal of the National Assembly and for the appointment of district councillors. Furthermore, it was the first time that voters were called on to elect the latter. A comparative study of these two elections would not be devoid of interest since it was not a matter of course — and what happened confirms the fact — that voters would vote the same way on the two ballots. Since the option of splitting their votes is denied them by the system that has been adopted, they might have been tempted to do so between the two elections. It is still too soon to glean from these two elections all of their lessons. By way of example of the time needed, the work that presents the results of the efforts of National Foundation for Political Sciences investigators with regard to the spring 1981 elections has just now been published ("1981: The Off-Year Elections," Studies edited by Alain Lancelot, National Foundation for Political Sciences Press). It would have taken almost the length of a legislative term. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a few reflections of general importance on voters' behavior, halfway between animated commentary and appropriately scientific analysis.



## A Few Surprises

While we have had plenty of time to get used to the results, it is not too late to reconsider the surprises they produced. Any surprise is worthy of our attention because it reveals a lack of harmony between anticipation and reality, between what we expected in conformity with a given kind of logic and what has actually happened. Such a discrepancy is not without significance. Now, as for surprises, the 16 March spoiled us. A surprise rarely occurs alone. Errors of judgment compensate for one another within a constant sum. The surprises involved almost all the components of the political system: a Socialist Party stronger than anticipated, a parliamentary Right wing below the minimum reckoned on, a Communist Party even weaker than had been announced and a more impressive extreme Right. And let us not forget Raymond Barre's semi-defeat in the town of Lyons. This counts for a lot and the professional observers, like the entire class of politicians, were no less disconcerted than the average voter. In view of the performances of the specialized institutes, everyone was accustomed to crediting them with practically infallible foreknowledge. They had so rarely been caught making a mistake! To the point where on election nights we go so far as to forget that all the commentaries are based on an absence of actual results that only reach us very late, on estimates based on limited samples.

So what happened on 16 March to throw off the predictions? Let us dismiss the facile explanation of the lag between the last polls published and the day of the election, those 8 days during which voting intentions continued to mount without the knowledge of the public. It is not valid since the very latest polls — those the results of which were communicated only to the happy few — scarcely differed from those of the previous week: On election eve they were still giving the Socialist Party only 28.5 percent, or 3 points less than the voters did, and continued to credit the coalition of the UDF [French Democratic Union] and the RPR [Rally for the Republic] with an absolute majority of seats.

To tell the truth, for those who do not have a short memory, this was not the first time that voters produced a surprise and that the results that come out of the ballot boxes do not confirm predictions. We might with some semblance of truth maintain that a series of major elections is a long run of surprises.

Giscard's massive success on 28 September 1958 was one of them, as was also the placement of General de Gaulle on the second ballot in the December 1965 presidential election — despite the fact that a poll had predicted it, but no one had paid any attention to it. The very small majority of March 1967 (which displays several similarities with that of last 16 March) was not predicted either. In March 1978 we expected a victory of the Left, but it was the Right that won. And finally, who does not remember that less than 2 months before the first ballot of the May 1981 presidential election no one doubted that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing would be reelected? The memory of this, which is an invitation to caution, should once and for all also destroy the notion that we see cropping up again periodically, that polls will henceforth render elections useless. A discrepancy, even a narrow one, between some people's figures and the results produced by others restores to a citizens' vote through elections its whole reason for existence. It also makes short work of the kind of

reasoning whereby some think they can derive an argument from the usual accuracy of statistical forecasts against voters' freedom of choice, which they claim to be nothing more than the unconscious instrument of some sort of collective determinism. The voter decidedly keeps his secret right to the end and the mystery continues to be a total one for as long as the ballot boxes are not opened.

Must we conclude from this long list of unsuccessful correspondences between forecasts and realities that the French voter is essentially fickle and that his fickleness precludes any rational prediction because his behavior does not correspond to any kind of logic? This would be a completely exaggerated conclusion since, accurately weighed in the balance, the discrepancies that we note are not so great that they upset major balances of power. They do not affect major tendencies. Whatever classification we adopt, the balance of power between Right and Left is not substantially changed. If we exclude the two extremes, the Communist Party and the National Front, the disparity is a little over 10 points to the advantage of the parliamentary Right. This is exactly what all the polls have been indicating for months. If we include all the parties in this dualist design of things, it remains on the same order of magnitude since the two extremes act in the same way. Now this difference, did it not constitute the main stake of the election, the big question?

The fact remains that the discrepancy between what was anticipated and the outcome, as small as it was, had a considerable impact and was unrelated to the evaluation figures at the time of the vote. Nothing better illustrates the ineluctably relative — I do not say either arbitrary or subjective — nature of any interpretation of results, even as abjective as mathematical balances of power among the parties. This is one of the lessons of what happened on 16 March. On every occasion the public ridicules these politicians who declare themselves to be completely satisfied with the results they inspect. We see how difficult it is for the latter to favor all of them in the satisfaction with which they display a presumption of insincerity. It is an injustice to their intelligence as well as to their honesty to fail to take into consideration the fact that any evaluation of an election result, in terms of failure or success, is not established only on presentation of the figures that come out of the teleprinters or appear on the little screen, but also in terms of the results of the previous elections and, moreover, in terms of expectations, anxious or optimistic, in particular of poll forecasts of people's voting intentions. The higher one sets the bar, the more one risks disappointing one's own people and feeding the satisfaction of one's opponent.

Considering the large number of elections that succeed one another at close intervals, the bases for comparison are numerous and the choice of one of them in preference to the others is not imposed on us by incontestable evidence; so, as concerns our parliamentary elections, one might hesitate. Were not the most recent of them, the European elections, necessary because of their proximity in time? All the more so since the distribution of seats had already accomplished in accordance with proportional representation. But last 16 March the voters were called on to designate the successors of those they had elected in June 1981. To boot, those elections followed a presidential election and much had been said at the time to the effect that the Left's victory was the

direct consequence of Francois Mitterrand's success. Now, depending on whether we take the presidential election or the parliamentary election as a basis for comparison, evaluation of the outcome of the 16 March election is completely changed: in particular for the Socialist Party. In comparison with the first ballot of the presidential election, in which its candidate obtained 26.1 percent of the vote, it showed a gain of over 5 points, but in comparison with the first ballot of the parliamentary elections in which, while it had risen to 37.7 percent, it showed a drop of 6 points. And if we calculate the mathematical average of the two — but this does not make much sense — it is constant. The least inaccurate, or the most honest, evaluation lies at the point of convergence of these different comparisons of which it is the result.

Has any other election ever in like manner demonstrated the importance of symbolic figures? The measure of the performances of each of the big parties was stopped for the public at a figure that defined a threshold below which there was obvious defeat and above which undeniable victory. Thus four figures summed up the expectations and stakes involved in the elections. In the Right these involved the number of elected representatives and in the Left they designated percentages of votes, since the Left had lost hope of continuing to be the majority. For the Communist Party the objective was to not drop below 10 percent. Of all the figures it was the one the symbolic nature of which most excluded any real effect, since what difference is there between 10.1 and 9.9 percent? Once the party leadership had chosen an all-out opposition strategy, access to the government was in any event denied it. Nevertheless, the importance of this threshold for its effect on people's minds is great. Dropping from a two-digit to a single-digit figure is always decisive. We may observe this in other areas: for inflation, at one or two digits or, for the exchange rate of the dollar, depending on whether it drops below 10 francs again or not. The assessment of political realities does not escape the fascination round numbers and the decimal system exert on the mind. For the Communist Party, dropping below 10 percent was also being set back by over 50 years, losing the gains of so many battles, leaving the private club of the big parties, and all this at the moment when the National Front was just about to get into it and perhaps conclusively set in motion a process of inescapable attrition. For the Socialist Party, the figure of 30 percent of the voters was of comparable significance, but in the opposite direction. Attaining that level was not only a consolation prize for its loss of power and a saving of its honor, but also a reassurance for the future.

The two other mathematical landmarks involve apparently more tangible objectives. The traditional Right was aiming at the figure of 289 elected representatives, which is, as we know, the threshold for an absolute majority in a National Assembly of 577 deputies. This is the figure above which the government may consider itself to be safe from a nasty surprise. Now, in spite of appearances, this figure is usually more of symbolic importance than actual importance. In the system instituted by the Fifth Republic and confirmed by Assembly rules, the government is no longer responsible for proving that it constitutes the majority, as was the case under the previous republics; it is up to the opposition to demonstrate that it is. As a result, any abstention counts in favor of the government and it is exceptional for adversaries to succeed in getting a unanimous vote on the text of a motion of censure. For any other



issue a relative majority suffices. Nevertheless, the figure of 289 assumed decisive importance. It was the test of victory. In proof of this, in the course of election evening all the controversies, all the commentaries revolved about the single question: Would the UDF-RPR coalition attain that fateful threshold, as though everything depended on it? And it was precisely because this outcome did not appear to be certain that the Right's victory assumed that doubtful air. For the National Front, on the other hand, having at their disposal 30 elected representatives was an urgent necessity. At least for want of being able to constitute a parliamentary delegation, it was without status, without a charter, excluded from the conference of chairmen, lacking an office, without any chance of expressing an opinion on the scheduling of the agenda and without time on the floor in the organized discussions. With this series of examples we can see how statistics, even the most objective of data the mind is capable of and manipulates, become so many elements of interpretations troubled by subjectivity.

### Lessons to Be Derived

With the benefit of these observations it becomes possible to establish a scale running from the absolute defeat for the Communist Party, which is losing on all the scoreboards, to the complete victory of the National Front — since it is entering the Palais Bourbon [Chamber of Deputies], is on a par with the Communist delegation and is, to boot, on the receiving end of a vote rate higher than the one it was credited with — to the relative one of the Right, which is going from the opposition to the exercise of power, but with a narrow majority and to the result obtained by the Socialist Party which, not having suffered the setback that seemed to have been indicated in the poll figures and in all the intervening elections, has the feeling of being miraculously healed.

Something else contributes to making comparisons difficult: the change in the way of voting, which alters the yardstick the distribution of seats serves as. With the majority vote that has been in use since 1958, the Right's victory would not have created more doubt than the Left's victory in June 1981. With 37.7 percent of the votes counted on, did not the Socialist Party obtain over 55 percent of the seats? With 6 points more, the Right would have had a body of elected representatives that would have demonstrated the reversal of the balance of power.

While the return to proportional representation deprived the Right of its victory, it has nevertheless not produced all the results that were expected of it, which some were hoping for and others feared: the splitting of votes and the crumbling of forces. It is true that the reform only produced limited respect for the principle of proportional representation; several provisions limited its effects. Let us begin with the department system: How could true proportional representation be applied in the 49 departments in which there were only two or three seats to distribute? The minimum of 5 percent of the votes required to be considered has eliminated the small tickets from the distribution and removed all hope of the extreme Left or the ecologists' getting one of their own into the Palais Bourbon. The chief explanation is, however, that voters, accustomed to an electoral discipline by 25 years of voting for

the majority, have not used the option afforded them of splitting their votes. Bipolarization has not suffered from the change; it has emerged nearly strengthened by the test. Three out of four voters have concentrated their votes on the two major parties, the Socialist Party and the UDF-RPR coalition. It seems to me to be legitimate today to treat the UDF and the RPR as a single party. The opinion polls reveal that voters distinguish less and less between them, with the exception of a fringe of more politicized activists who excel at perceiving the subtleties of the platforms and the nuances that separate them. The rapprochement has been achieved through the UDF's liberal positions: While the RPR has imposed itself as the chief and most coherent force and tends to exercise a sort of dominion over the coalition, in working out the platform it is more the UDF that is divided in its views on major issues. The RPR has gotten rid of its mistrust of European organization and repudiated its statist inclinations in the domain of economic policy. So, only four factions subsist in the new National Assembly, two of which are undividedly dominant. Between these two alone, the two principal forces, socialist on the Left and liberal on the Right, they control a little over 500 of the 577 deputies.

The National Front's breakthrough and the entry in force of its 35 elected representatives must not be allowed to disguise a development that is perhaps must as important and which tends to make itself felt more and more as elections come and go: the weakening of the extremes [of the political spectrum] to the advantage of the intermediate parties. Added together, the two constituencies, Communist and National Front, amount to a little under 20 percent. What a change in comparison with the usual situation during the Third and Fourth Republics, in which the coalition of the two politically opposed groups, extreme Right and extreme Left, in the government often constituted a majority! Between 1947 and 1952 the parties united in the Third Force that shared the responsibilities of government were minority parties caught between the pincers of the Communist opposition and the opposition led by General de Gaulle. Everything suggests that voters are today more and more repelled by extremist solutions and are unaffected by simplistic speeches. The answers to a question raised in connection with a poll conducted recently by the young OBSERVATOIRE INTER-REGIONAL DU POLITIQUE are very significant in this respect. The persons interviewed were asked which parties they did not consider they might some day vote for. Many of them in equivalent proportions mentioned the Communist Party (36 percent) and Jean-Marie Le Pen's party (34 percent); on the other hand, very few voters who usually vote conservative excluded the possibility of some day voting Socialist (1.5 percent) and, correspondingly, there were very few Socialist voters who swore that they would never give their votes to a rightist candidate (3 percent). Are we not, moreover, right in thinking that even Jean-Marie Le Pen only achieved like success because he adopted deliberately moderated language and because at that cost to himself he only attracted a fringe element of voters who for that reason persist in not seeing for what reasons the other parties dispute his creditability?

The major surprise of these elections will no doubt continue to be the fact that, in bringing the Socialist Party above 30 percent and in denying the Right (which we no longer know exactly how to refer to since the entry into Parliament of a powerful extreme Right faction prevents us from reserving the term, parliamentary Right, for it) the few percentage points that would have assured



it sovereign control over political decisions, they have created the conditions we did not dare to dream of for a beginning of cohabitation. The voters have thus brought out a representative case which the licensed interpreters of our Constitution had hardly dreamed of. Since we have asked ourselves what might become of our institutions the day the will of the people should confront two powers of opposing persuasions with one another, only two scenarios have claimed our attention: one, which has up to now been the actual case, a president depending for his support on a majority loyal and docile with respect to his policies, and the other, the opposite of the first, a president pitted against a majority opposed to him and no less compact. Now, a third representative case has just arisen, in which the two powers are, to be sure, opposed to one another, but both of them relatively weakly so. The president is obviously so, even though he has succeeded in preserving his essential prerogatives — and Francois Mitterrand was more prompt than his party to acknowledge that the Left has lost its power. But the new majority has also been too slim and precarious to be in a position to dictate its terms to him. Proof of this is the fact that on the evening of 16 March there was no longer any question of the possibility of the president's leaving the government and no conservative politician appeared to have recalled that he had agitated for the alternative — submit or resign — nor that he had alluded to the precedents of 1877 or 1924. So now the two powers have been forced to compromise. Whatever may happen as a result of this, even if cohabitation should not last beyond a few months and particularly if it does not withstand the cutting verbal forays that will be increasing in number with the approach of the race for the presidency, the fact will remain that a beginning of cohabitation was possible and attempted. For him who is familiar with the power of precedents in experimenting with any new institutional system, there is no doubt that the Constitution is in the process of getting through the last ordeal left for it to overcome to demonstrate its ability to adapt in fairly good shape.

Now, this unexpected situation is essentially the result of how voters voted. It was they and they alone who, through the combined power of their millions of ballots, created it and confronted politicians with choices they had not anticipated. Therefore, everything happened as though the voters had wanted to give cohabitation its chance by rejecting its avowed adversaries and forcing the hand of the others. So, must we ascribe to the electorate an explicit intentionality and presume that the form of expression the electorate unconsciously employs is not only an image, but really represents an organic reality? We cannot overly much refrain from the temptation of an organicistic view that attributes to these 37 million voters a perfectly factitious unity. We base our arguments on statistical aggregates on which the law of large numbers confers a deceptive constancy. When we calculate what becomes of the 2 or 3 percent of votes lost through such data or, if we ask ourselves where the 2 other percentage points gained by another faction come from, through this appearance of stability we lose sight of the extreme fluidity of individual particles and the mobility of personal itineraries. We grasp only the balances, positive or negative, that conceal large-scale movements, transfers, exchanges or circular permutations. Moreover, we set up rational bodies that we baptize right, left, moderate, extreme, but which are not immediately perceptible

realities. No more so than the notion that an invisible hand directs economic developments, in political operations there is not a single will that governs the movements of the electorate.

And yet, in the face of their behavior, how can we keep from getting the impression that voters really submit to some inspiration shared by the majority of them? This feeling is corroborated by the opinion polls. If there is one point on which public opinion has evinced apparent constancy for several months now, it is certainly rejection of the government crisis and the conflict between the two powers. The majority of the voters are sold on the cohabitation approach and refuse to give it up. Raymond Barre got a taste of this when he was on the program, "The Moment of Truth." It was the only problem regarding which he failed to convince his listeners, whereas he won over a majority of them on all the other points. This is probably also the chief explanation for his semi-defeat in Lyons. A poll taken after 16 March confirmed the fact that the attempt at cohabitation satisfied the largest number of people: 63 or 64 percent as against 17 or 19 percent approved of Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac for having attempted it, that is, much more than two out of three Frenchmen, and Francois Mitterrand's rating has never been higher since then. The proof seems to have been well adduced that the electorate wanted cohabitation and that it demonstrated this through its choice of deputies. Is not this ability of universal suffrage to impose a policy one of the characteristics of democracy?

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3519/193

POLITICAL

GREECE

#### INTRA-PASOK POLITICAL ORIENTATION PROBLEMS

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 11 Jun 86 p 1

[Text] The timeliness of municipal elections, and the advertising of intense disagreements within PASOK over the choice of certain candidates for mayor and the arbitrary methods of selecting them, have concealed a serious political and organizational problem which has emerged in the heart of the party. According to EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA's excellent information, the leadership of PASOK's party machinery believes a new "obstructionist movement" has been formed in certain northern Greek organizations, specifically, those in Salonica, Xanthi and Evros, as well as in the Athens student group.

As one of the highest PASOK officials told us, this third-world, obstructionist movement has already revealed itself at a meeting of the Salonica Nome, whose representatives strongly criticized both the government's ideological orientations and A. Papandreou and his entourage personally. Similar opinions, with strong anti-western preaching about the need for PASOK to be transformed into an "authentic popular party of the masses," have been expressed at other party conferences in Komotini, Alexandroupolis and Athens. These third-world supporters are considered to be strongly influenced by the preachings of Pietro Ingrao and other third-world perceptions, the pivotal point being creating a "Mediterranean economic unity," and are estimated to number 500 to 600 cadres. Furthermore, a chief characteristic of the "third-worldists" is unproductive nationalism; for this reason, at the meeting in Salonica, it was maintained that the government must proclaim, in a bold stroke, the...Union of Cyprus with Greece "as an answer to U.S. imperialism and Turkish expansionism."

According to our information, the movement of "third-worldists" deeply concerns A. Papandreou who has given orders for them to be dealt with severely, the first goal being to exclude them from local party positions (as has happened) and then to expel them.

9247  
CSO: 3521/176

POLITICAL

NORWAY

## FORMER NONSOCIALIST GOVERNING PARTNERS DISUNITED IN OPPOSITION

### Cooperation Collapse Decried

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jun 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Cooperation on What?"; word between slantlines is italicized in original]

[Text] If the nonsocialist parties agree on nothing else, they assure us to a man that their willingness to cooperate is strong. They are, as the saying goes, convinced that they can get together again to form a government when the time comes. It would be wrong to say that many others share their conviction. Indeed, these forced assurances raise more questions than they answer. We note on the plus side that the former government partners recognize the need to cite a willingness to cooperate.

Frankly speaking, however, what will they cooperate on if the time comes when it is "necessary and desirable"? Will they rally round in support of the tighter monetary policy which the Conservative Party alone proposed during discussion of the government's revised national budget? Will they in concert arrange for new investment-stimulating tax cuts in order to compensate for the increase in gross taxes which has already been approved? Or is there any belief that the non-socialists will gather to support new tax hikes?

The questions are endless. What we can establish is that the expressed willingness to cooperate lacks credibility so long as the parties are unable to say which policy they will pursue when they run the government. At the first crossroads after the Labor Party's assumption of power, they were incapable of agreeing on a nonsocialist alternative. In trying situations, we can all take comfort in the fact that tomorrow is another day, but the precondition is that we have some idea of what we will use the blank sheet of paper and the colored pencils for.

The only thing that the Conservative Party, Christian People's Party, and Center Party have so far managed to rally behind in the opposition can be summed up in the following formulation: Together we go our separate ways. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland is not exaggerating when she asserts that the government "can live with" the present situation.

Confidence in the nonsocialist parties' capacity to cooperate does not grow when top-level politicians openly discuss the issue of the composition of a possible new three-party government without knowing whether an agreement can be reached on a unifying political platform.

We will not rule out that the governing Labor Party may cause an industrial accident which triggers a government crisis. The country is not well served, however, by having the three nonsocialist parties stumble into the offices of power again. In short, the party leaders must sit down and work out the unifying political strategy which is conspicuous today by its absence. Until they prove their /ability/ to cooperate, the tediously repeated willingness to cooperate is simply not believable.

#### Conservatives See Autumn Opportunity

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by Ole Johan Nilsen: "Conservative Party Chairman Optimistic; Agreement With Progress Party Before 'Autumn Attack'"; first paragraph is boldfaced lead-in in original]

[Text] The autumn attack on the Labor Party government can begin as soon as the three collaborative parties are certain that a new nonsocialist government will have better working conditions than the previous one. This requires discussion beforehand with the Progress Party. But the Conservative Party's central board can imagine the resumption of government responsibility only if it receives a "reasonable" assurance that it will have the opportunity to work undisturbed. The Conservative Party's candidate for prime minister? Kare Willoch, that much is clear. Anyone other than a Conservative in the leadership would be unlikely, said Rolf Presthus, chairman of the Conservative Party, at a press conference after the central board's meeting yesterday.

Most of the questions concerned the prospects for a change of government. Presthus made it clear that a change could occur as soon as there was assurance that a new nonsocialist government would have better working conditions than the one which fell. This must be discussed with the Progress Party, and until then there is no point in toppling the Labor Party government.

#### Agreement Possible

"But I don't disregard the possibility that a crisis can arise which leads to a change, even if no agreement exists with the Progress Party," added Presthus. He himself thought it was possible to reach the kind of agreement the three collaborative parties are looking for. The parliamentary leaders of the parties concerned must themselves decide how this agreement will be obtained. Presthus characterized current contacts as "irregular." This does not mean, however, that the question of who will govern is on the agenda when someone nowadays meets with the Progress Party's leader. It is more a matter of "natural conversations."



Presthus found cause to point out that Carl I. Hagen had made it clear before the election that his party would support Willoch on a parliamentary vote of confidence.

It was mentioned that Hagen had broken this promise. Presthus replied that today there would be no insistence on a written guarantee for a minority government; such a thing is not common. "But," he added, "if we know that a new non-socialist government will be toppled a month or two after it takes over, then there is good reason to shy away from bringing down the Harlem Brundtland government. We must have a securer foundation."

#### Opportunity to Work Undisturbed

According to the party chairman, a keen willingness emerged on the part of the Conservative Party's central board to resume government responsibility even if a new nonsocialist government received no complete clarification of the parliamentary situation. Presthus said this must be "accompanied, to be sure, by the reasonable assurance that it will have the opportunity to work undisturbed." A resolution concerning this was passed in which the central board unanimously declared that a new collaborative government can get down to work "as soon as the situation in the Storting enables such a government to receive support for the measures which are necessary to bring economic developments under control."

In another declaration, the central board deplores the fact that the Labor Party government has created uncertainty about Norwegian defense and security policy. It finds particularly ill-advised the Foreign Ministry's statement about the allies' showing restraint in future naval maneuvers in our waters out of consideration for Soviet rearmament.

The central board approved a request to the nominating committees in the county and municipal parties in which the former are asked to set up enough parties on secure spots on the slates to constitute at least 40 percent of those nominated, and a corresponding figure among those accumulated beforehand.

12327

CSO: 3639/126

POLITICAL

TURKEY

## VOTER SURVEY RESULTS, PARTY OFFICIALS' REACTIONS REPORTED

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 11-13 May 86

[11 May 86 p 7]

### [Excerpts] How the Survey Was Conducted

Only three parties were permitted to participate in the general elections of 6 November 1983. Those elections were held in 83 electoral districts. In those elections, the Motherland Party [MP] won 45.14 percent, the Populist Party won 30.46 percent and the Nationalist Democracy Party [NDP] won 23.27 percent of the vote. Was there a narrower [electoral] base which had roughly the same voting distribution? Electoral districts were scanned for similar results with a deviation of plus or minus 10 percent. It was determined that six electoral districts met this test. These electoral districts were: The 2nd electoral districts of Adana and Manisa and the electoral districts of Bilecik, Corum, Denizli and Sakarya. If the 6 November 1983 elections were held only in these districts, MP would have won 45.85 percent, the Populist Party would have won 30.20 percent and NDP would have won 23.34 percent of the vote.

Since the voter survey was planned to be conducted in county seats, the second stage of scrutinization was held at the county seat level. The average of the election results in most of the county seats of the electoral districts of Bilecik and Corum and the 2nd electoral district of Manisa and a significant portion of the county seats in 2nd electoral district of Adana was within 1 percent of the overall election results.

### Sampling

The third level of scrutinization was the determination of the neighborhoods whose voting patterns matched the overall election results with a 5 percent deviation for each party. It was originally planned to hold the survey in Bilecik, Corum and Manisa, but when Corum delayed to issue the permission to conduct the survey, the 2nd electoral district of Adana was selected as part of the control sample. The survey was held in 35 neighborhoods of 13 counties with populations ranging from 2,000 to 100,000. If the elections of 6 November 1983 were held only in the neighborhoods where the survey was conducted, MP would have won 45.20 percent, the Populist Party would have won 30.74 percent and NDP would have won 23.98 percent of the vote. In other

words, the average election results of these neighborhoods matched national results of the 6 November 1983 elections with a deviation of 105 parts in 10,000.

It was calculated that it would be necessary to poll 1,766 individuals in these neighborhoods to measure changes in voting patterns with a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percent and a confidence of level of 99 percent and assuming maximum deviation ( $p = q$ ). This sample size was divided among the neighborhoods in accordance with the relative number of voters in each neighborhood.

### Survey Implementation

To insure the reliability of the survey, the neighborhoods selected for the survey were delineated and maps were drawn out for them. All homes in each neighborhood were given an equal chance to be included in the control sample. The pollsters, who were sent to the field under the supervision of coordinators, interviewed a single person from each household selected. It was later computed that 46.8 percent of those interviewed were women and 53.2 percent were men. The age distribution the respondents was as follows: 21-29 years, 27.5 percent; 30-44 years, 39.6 percent; 45-59 years, 22.3 percent; and 60 years and above, 10.3 percent. About 0.3 percent of those interviewed did not respond to questions about their age. Housewives constituted 42.5 percent of the respondents. About 0.9 percent of those interviewed did not respond to the question about their occupation. The occupation profile of the respondents, other than housewives and those who did not respond, was as follows: Small businessmen, 29.2 percent; teachers, civil servants, military officers and policemen, 20.6 percent; workers, 17.5 percent; farmers, 15.6 percent; unemployed, 4.8 percent; others, 12.3 percent. The education profile of the respondents was as follows: Persons with less than primary school education, 23.0 percent; primary school graduates, 48.3 percent; middle or high school graduates, 23.0 percent; persons with some higher education and college graduates, 5.3 percent. Voters who would cast ballots for the first time constituted 8.4 percent of the control sample, and 9.1 percent of those interviewed had not voted or had their votes invalidated in the 6 November 1983 elections. Those who refused to state who they voted for in the 6 November 1983 elections and those who stated that they voted for independents constituted 1.9 percent of the control sample. Moreover, 80.6 percent of the respondents voted for MP, the Populist Party or NDP in the 1983 elections. These voters' party affiliation among the three parties was preserved during the analysis of survey results using weighting techniques.

### Some Difficulties

Two difficulties were encountered during the survey. One difficulty was some voters' refusal to answer questions; the second problem was that some voters—particularly women—did not remember who they voted for in the 1983 elections and did not know what party they would vote for in the next elections. The first difficulty was to a large extent overcome by explaining to the participants that their names and addresses would not be recorded and that personal information about them would not be given to any individual or organization. The pollsters tried to solve the second problem by asking the

participants to describe the party emblem or to name the party leader. In the event no response was obtained for both questions, the neighboring household was substituted for the nonresponsive household.

In Western countries, where a lot of experience has been gained in this field, election forecasts can come very close to the actual outcome. Planned surveys using random sampling techniques can produce fairly accurate results provided that the polling area is not very large and that records of detailed information about the general population are utilized. If such records cannot be used in the sampling process and if the polling region is too large, different sampling techniques must be used. One such technique is quota sampling; another technique—the one used in this survey—is that of reducing the sample size by determining "typical" regions. While both of these techniques have their advantages, they also have their disadvantages. The minimization of the disadvantages of both techniques requires the development of proven sample planning methods that are compatible with the conditions of the country.

[Signed] Data Research Corporation.

If general elections were held today, those undecided about who they would vote for would determine the outcome of the elections. According to the results of a voter survey conducted between 24 and 27 April by the Data Research Corporation for CUMHURIYET, 23.5 percent of the voters—that is roughly one out of every four voters—is undecided. The largest percentage of the voters who have made up their minds would vote for the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] and MP. If the elections were held today, 32.1 percent of the voters would vote for SDPP and 26.8 percent would vote for MP (See Table 1).

Table 1. Who would you vote for if elections were held today?

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
SDPP	32.1
MP	26.8
CWP [Correct Way Party]	10.8
NDP	2.5
DLP [Democratic Left Party]	2.5
Independent candidates	0.8
PP [Prosperity Party]	0.6
NWP [Nationalist Work Party]	0.4
Undecided	23.5
Total	100.0

While the second-ranking party on the right, CWP, appears to have at least 10.8 percent of the vote, support for the second-ranking party on the left, DLP, does not exceed 2.5 percent for the moment. Another party for which 2.5 percent of the respondents have voted is NDP, which dissolved itself a few

days after the survey was conducted (4 May). Table 1 shows that voter support for the other parties on the right, PP and NWP, remains below 1 percent (0.6 and 0.4 percent, respectively).

Table 2. Who would you vote for if elections were held today? (Distribution of votes assuming that the undecided would vote like the other respondents)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
SDPP	42.0
MP	35.0
CWP	14.1
NDP	3.3
DLP	3.3
Independent candidates	0.9
PP	0.8
NWP	0.6
Total	100.0

Table 3. Voting patterns in the 6 November 1983 general elections, 25 March 1984 local elections and voter survey of 24-27 April 1986 (percent of respondents)

<u>Party</u>	<u>6 November 1983 general elections</u>	<u>25 March 1984 * local elections</u>	<u>24-27 April 1986 ** voter survey</u>
MP	45.1	41.4	35.0
SDPP (Populist Party + Social Democracy Party)	30.5	32.2	42.0
CWP	—	13.2	14.1
NDP	23.3	7.1	3.3
DLP	—	—	3.3
PP	—	4.5	0.8
NWP	—	—	0.6
Independents	1.1	1.6	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* - Provincial general assembly elections

\*\* - Assuming that undecided voters would vote like the remaining respondents

#### Who Would Win? First Assumption

Who would win if elections were held today? The answer to this question depends on how the ballots of the undecided voters would be distributed among the parties running in the elections. Major reasons for the relatively large number of undecided voters is the fact that elections are not going to be held



soon and the fact that some voters--on the right as well as on the left--have not yet made up their minds about which of the competing parties they are going to vote for.

How will the undecided voters act? Various assumptions can be made on this issue. A widely used assumption is that the undecided voters will vote in exactly the same pattern as the decided voters will.

Under this assumption, if elections were held today, SDPP would win 42.0 percent, MP would win 35.0 percent, CWP would win 14.1 percent and DLP would win 3.3 percent of the votes (see Table 2). Support for PP and NWP would once again be less than 1 percent of the vote. NDP's share of 3.3 percent could be expected to be divided up among the rightist parties, but it is evident that that would not significantly change the final outcome.

Assuming that the undecided voters would vote exactly in the same way as the decided voters, the votes would be distributed between the right and the left as follows: On the left, the combined vote for SDPP and DLP would total 45.3 percent, and on the right combined voter support for MP, CWP, NDP (now defunct), PP and NWP would amount to 53.8 percent of the ballots. Thus, there is a distinct preference for the right among the voters.

Also on the basis of the same assumption, it is seen that there has been a steady decline in voter support for MP, the only party that has survived since the 6 November 1983 elections. On the other hand, voter support for the Populist Party and the Social Democracy Party--that is SDPP, which was born out of the merger of these two parties--has increased (see Table 3).

Table 4. Who would you vote for if elections were held today? (Distribution of votes assuming that changes in the voting pattern of the undecided over what they voted in 1983 would be similar to changes in the voting patterns of other voters over what they voted in 1983)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
SDPP	40.6
MP	36.1
CWP	14.5
DLP	3.3
PP [Prosperity Party]	0.8
NWP	0.6
Other	4.1
Total	100.0

#### Second Assumption

The 6 November 1983 voting pattern of the undecided voters in the survey was as follows:

MP.....	41.0 percent
NDP.....	19.3 percent
Populist Party.....	16.3 percent
Other.....	18.6 percent
No response.....	4.8 percent

This pattern shows that voters sympathetic to the right form the majority of those who are undecided today. In view of this fact one may charge that the assumption that undecided voters would vote in the same way as the others if the elections were held today is not realistic. Thus, it can be said that such an assumption may result in a forecast that indicates a lower voter support for the parties of the right than what they would really get.

In the light of this information about the undecided voters, we can make a second assumption regarding their possible voting behavior. This second assumption is that changes in the voting patterns of the undecided voters over what they voted in 1983 (that is their vote distribution among MP, the Populist Party and NDP) would be the same as the changes in the voting patterns of the others who voted for those parties in 1983.

Under this assumption, which looks more realistic, the vote distribution would be as follows if elections were held today: SDPP, 40.6 percent; MP, 36.1 percent; CWP, 14.5 percent; DLP 3.3 percent; PP 0.8 percent; and NWP, 0.6 percent (see Table 4).

Table 5. Who would you vote for if elections were held today? (Distribution of votes assuming that the undecided voters would vote for the party that they believe would win the elections)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
SDPP	33.9
MP	33.2
CWP	11.1
DLP	2.5
Other	4.5
Undecided	14.8
Total	100.0

### Third Assumption

A third assumption that can be made about the possible voting behavior of the undecided is that they would vote for the party that they believe would win the elections if elections were held today.

Under this assumption, voter support for SDPP and MP would come very close: SDPP would win 33.9 percent and MP would win 33.2 percent of the vote; CWP would win 11.1 percent and DLP would get 2.5 percent of the vote. However, the undecided still form a substantial group (see Table 5) which can determine

the outcome of the election because a major portion of the undecided respondents did not answer to our question "Which party would win the elections if they were held today?" with the name of a party.

[12 May 86 p 7]

[Excerpts] What party would the voters who cast ballots in the 6 November 1983 elections vote for if elections were held today? Would the supporters of MP, which is the only party that has survived since the 1983 elections, vote for MP again, or has there been a change in their preferences? In 1983 some voters cast their ballots for the Populist Party and NDP which no longer exist. How would this voters vote today?

Table 1. What party would MP voters in the 6 November 1983 elections vote for today?

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
MP	44.9
Undecided	25.0
SDPP	12.6
CWP	11.0
Other parties	2.5
Will not vote	4.0
Total	100.0

Our analysis shows that only 44.9 percent, or less than half, of the MP voters of 1983 are planning to vote for MP again. A quarter (25 percent) of the MP voters of 1983 are undecided about who they would vote for today. About one-eighth (12.6 percent) of these voters have decided to vote for SDPP, and a group almost as large (11.6 percent) have decided to vote for CWP. Four percent have indicated that they do not plan to vote (see Table 1).

These results indicate that most of the voter support for MP has dissipated. SDPP and CWP have captured small but significant portions of the MP vote. One can easily say that those defecting to SDPP are voters who voted for MP under the abnormal conditions of 1983, who vote for left-of-center parties under normal circumstances and who are now "returning to their nests."

The results also show that CWP, which is competing with MP from the right, has managed to attract more than a tenth of the MP voters to itself. It is evident that the "undecided MP supporters," which we determined to be a quarter of the MP voters, will be a major bone of contention among the competing parties in the next election.

Table 2. What party would Populist Party voters in the 6 November 1983 elections vote for today?

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
SDPP	69.9
Undecided	14.8
MP	6.1
DLP	3.8
Will not vote	3.5
CWP	1.7
Other parties or independents	0.2
Total	100.0

Nearly seven-tenths (69.9 percent) of former Populist Party voters would vote for SDPP today and 3.8 percent would support DLP. The undecided group (14.8 percent) of former Populist Party supporters may be said to be unsure about what party of the left they would vote for. One portion of the former Populist Party supporters, namely 7.8 percent of them, are planning to vote for right-of-center parties (MP or CWP) (see Table 2).

Table 3. What party would NDP voters in the 6 November 1983 elections vote for today?

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
CWP	21.7
Undecided	22.5
SDPP	16.9
MP	14.8
NDP	11.2
DLP	3.2
Will not vote	6.4
Other parties or independents	3.3
Total	100.0

One interesting result of our survey is that NDP, which dissolved itself on 4 May, was already largely defunct in the eyes of the voters. According to the CUMHURIYET survey which was held between 24 and 27 April, only 11.2 percent of those who voted for NDP in the 1983 elections would vote again for that party today (see Table 3). The remaining former NDP supporters are divided among CWP, SDPP and MP, in the following manner: 21.7 percent would vote for CWP, 16.9 percent would vote for SDPP and 14.8 percent would vote for MP.

Around 20 percent of former NDP supporters would vote for SDPP or DLP. This result indicates that voters who would normally vote for left-of-center parties voted for NDP under the abnormal conditions of the 1983 elections.



The results indicate that 22.5 percent, or nearly a quarter, of former NDP supporters are undecided about what party they would vote for today. In view of the fact that NDP is now dissolved, it is evident that 33.7 percent, or more than a third, of former NDP voters may expect to be divided up among other parties.

#### New Voters' Dispositions

Of the 1,776 respondents who took part in our survey, 8.4 percent were not of voting age in 1983 and would be first-time voters if elections were held today.

The proportion of undecided voters (22.2 percent) in this group, which will join the voting population for the first time, is very similar to the overall proportion of undecided voters. MP supporters among new voters seem to be the largest group, although the number of those planning to vote for MP (32.1 percent) is very close to the number of those who would vote for SDPP (28.2 percent) (see Table 4).

Table 4. How would first-time voters cast their ballots [if elections were held] today?

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
MP	32.1
SDPP	28.2
Undecided	22.2
CWP	6.7
DLP	4.7
Other	6.1
Total	100.0

Table 5. Voting pattern of those who would vote for MP today in the 1983 elections

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
MP	64.4
NDP	11.2
Populist Party	5.9
Did not vote	6.7
Ineligible to vote	10.6
No response	1.2
Total	100.0

#### How Did Voters Supporting MP, SDPP, CWP Today Vote in 1983?

Of those who have indicated that they would vote for MP if elections were held today, 64.4 percent, or nearly two-thirds, voted for MP in the 1983 elections.

The results show that 11.2 percent of the present MP supporters are former NDP voters and 5.9 percent are former Populist Party voters. The remainder of those who plan to vote for MP today are new voters (10.6 percent) or persons who were ineligible to vote or who cast invalid ballots in 1983 (6.7 percent).

These results indicate that the new voters won by MP since 1983 are largely first-time voters or persons who did not vote in the 1983 elections. These two groups constitute 18.5 percent of the respondents who plan to vote for MP today. Voters who supported NDP and the Populist Party in 1983 constitute 17.1 percent of those who plan to vote for MP today (see Table 5).

#### Who Are SDPP Supporters?

Of those who would vote for SDPP if elections were held today, 56.7 percent voted for the Populist Party in 1983. More than a quarter of those who would vote for SDPP voted for MP or NDP in the 1983 elections. The results indicate that 15.1 percent of those who would vote for SDPP today voted for MP in 1983 and 10.6 voted for NDP. The proportion of first-time voters and those who did not vote in 1983 among present SDPP supporters is small (16.7 percent) compared to their proportion among present MP voters.

Table 6. Voting pattern of those who would vote for SDPP today in the 1983 elections

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
Populist Party	56.7
MP	15.1
NDP	10.6
Did not vote	8.9
Ineligible to vote	7.8
No response	0.9
Total	100.0

Table 7. Voting pattern of those who would vote for CWP today in the 1983 elections

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
NDP	40.6
MP	39.3
Populist Party	4.2
Did not vote	8.8
Ineligible to vote	5.5
No response	1.6
Total	100.0

## Source of CWP Votes

Those who voted for NDP and MP in the 1983 elections constitute the majority of the respondents who have indicated that they would vote for CWP if elections were held today. Former NDP and MP supporters hold nearly equal shares in the present CWP voting bloc. Of those who would vote for CWP today, 40.6 percent voted for NDP and 39.3 percent voted for MP in 1983.

A very small portion (4.2 percent) of those who would vote for CWP are persons who voted for the Populist Party in 1983. The proportion of new voters among present CWP voters (5.5 percent) is smaller than comparable figures for MP and SDPP. Other data taken in our survey confirms that older voters constitute a major portion of CWP supporters.

[13 May 86 p 7]

[Excerpts] Based on the responses to the question "Who would you vote for if elections were held today?" SDPP would have a substantial lead (32.1 percent) over MP (26.8 percent). But responses to the question "Which party would win if elections were held today?" point to a quite different result: 32.2 percent of the respondents believe that MP would win if elections were held today, and only 22.4 percent believe that SDPP would win. Also, 10.5 percent of the respondents think that a coalition would be necessary if elections were held today. The results further show that 6.4 percent of the voters think CWP would win the elections and 8.8 percent of the respondents believe other parties would win. A large proportion of those polled responded "I do not know"; more than one out of every four voters (26.1 percent) did not have an opinion on who would win if elections were held today.

Table 1. What party would win if elections were held today?

<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
MP	32.2
SDPP	22.4
Coalition would be necessary	10.5
CWP	6.4
Other	2.4
Do not know	26.1
Total	100.0

## Advantages of Being in Power

The results tabularized above indicate that there is no dominant view prevailing among the voters about which party would win the elections today. However, the fact that those who believe MP would win are more numerous than those who think SDPP would win even though more people would vote for SDPP than for MP if elections were held today suggests a widespread impression among the voters that the party in power has a better chance of winning an election. This is the observation that emerges from the analysis of the responses given to the question "Who would win?" by the supporters of the three parties most likely to be represented in the parliament.

Table 2. Correlation between voters' preference for parties and their prediction of the outcome of elections (percent of respondents who would vote for a particular party)

Party voter thinks would win elections	Party voter would vote for			
	MP	SDPP	CWP	Other
MP	65.2	16.7	14.1	26.6
SDPP	3.6	56.8	8.9	9.6
CWP	1.8	1.3	44.4	3.0
Coalition necessary	8.0	8.3	15.1	13.4
Other	0.2	0.5	—	6.2
Do not know	21.2	16.4	17.5	41.2
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Among those who would vote for MP, 65.2 percent believe that the party they vote for would win if elections were held today. The comparable figure is 56.8 percent for SDPP and 44.4 percent for CWP. A considerable proportion of those who would vote for SDPP and CWP think that MP would be the winner: 16.7 percent of those who would vote for SDPP and 14.1 percent of those who would vote for CWP believe that MP would be victorious. On the other hand, MP supporters who give any chance of winning to SDPP and CWP constitute only 3.6 and 1.8 percent of their group, respectively.

#### How Decided Are Voters?

In the survey, the question "Who would you vote for if elections were held today?" was followed with the question "Are you decided on voting for this party or would you change your decision?" The purpose of this question was to form an idea about how decided the respondents were about their party preferences.

Table 3. Voters' decidedness levels for their party preferences (percent of respondents who vote for a particular party)

Party	"I will definitely vote for this party"		"I may vote for another party"	
MP	62.0		38.0	
NWP	77.3		22.7	
CWP	80.1		19.9	
SDPP	83.5		16.5	
DLP	91.6		8.4	
PP	93.5		6.5	



the survey results indicate that the most decided among the three largest parties (MP, SDPP and CWP) are those who would vote for SDPP. Only 16.5 percent of those who stated that they would vote for SDPP said that they may change their preference. The comparable figure is higher (19.9 percent) among CWP voters and reaches as high as 38.0 percent among MP supporters. In other words, if elections were held today, roughly 4 out of every 10 respondents who said they would vote for MP may change their mind and vote for another party.

The level of decidedness among supporters of small parties is higher than those of SDPP and CWP. The proportion of DLP and PP supporters who said that they may change their minds is 8.4 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. The comparable figure for NWP voters is as high as 22.7 percent (see Table 3).

Table 4. Is there a party whose views closely match yours?

Voters who would for:	Yes	No
CWP	72.7	27.3
SDPP	71.9	28.1
MP	56.7	43.3
Undecided	8.3	91.7

#### Match Between Party and Voter Views

Do voters vote for parties whose views match theirs closely or do they use other criteria in their party preferences? To find an answer to this question, we included in the survey the question "Is there a party whose views closely match yours?" Nearly half (51 percent) of the respondents answered "yes" to this question. Those responding "yes" constituted 59 percent of the men and 42 percent of the women. This difference may be explained by the fact that in our country men are generally better educated and more knowledgeable about political affairs than women.

Our findings indicate that voters who stated that there was a party whose views closely matched theirs would also vote for that party (with very few exceptions). Consequently, affirmative answers to the question "Is there a party whose views closely match yours?" can be taken as a measure of the strength of the ties between a voter and a party.

According to survey results, nearly three quarters of CWP and SDPP voters (72.7 and 71.9 percent, respectively) indicated that there is a party whose views closely match theirs, while the comparable figure for MP was only 56.7 percent (see Table 4). As expected, this figure is as low as 8.3 percent among those who are undecided about who they would vote for.

These results suggest that CWP and SDPP voters are more strongly tied to their respective parties than MP supporters.

## Differences Between SDPP and CWP Voters

The survey found that there were no significant differences among supporters of the three largest parties in terms of sex, age group, education level and occupation. In this connection, it was observed that voter support for SDPP decreases with increasing age. An analysis of the correlation between education level and party preference indicates that voter support for SDPP increases in higher education groups. These two trends are reversed for CWP.

## Party Officials Comment on Survey Results

The political parties gave their evaluation of the election survey conducted by the Data Research Corporation for CUMHURİYET. SDPP Secretary General Mustafa Timisi interpreted the results as: "The people see the social democrats as an alternative." Other party officials stated that they do not think the survey results are realistic. DLP officials declined to comment on the results. MP leader Turgut Ozal said in response to a question: "Only three provinces have been considered. The issue must be viewed more generally. We are the largest party." MP Secretary General Mustafa Tasar said: "Perhaps the pollsters should vote in the elections." CWP leader Husamettin Cindoruk stated: "I believe what I see--not survey results." PP leader Ahmet Tekdal declared that he does "not see his party as weak as that." NWP deputy leader Hasan Tokuslu said that he does "not believe the survey gives a true picture of the situation." The political parties gave the following evaluations of survey results, according to which SDPP would come first, MP would come second, CWP third, and DLP, PP and NWP would come fourth, fifth and sixth, respectively, with an undecided bloc of 23.5 percent if elections were held today:

MP leader Turgut Ozal: The latest public opinion surveys indicate that voter support for our party has, on the contrary, increased. It is my personal opinion that SDPP is losing votes. In your survey only three provinces have been considered. These three provinces do not represent Turkey. The issue must be viewed from the more general viewpoint of Turkey. Secondly, even if assume that the results of this survey are realistic we are faced with the following conclusion for a second time: If you put together the votes cast for parties with similar views to ours, that is the NDP, CWP and NWP, it is seen that they do not have the strength to be represented in the Assembly and that even if they are represented they would not be able to form an assembly group. A third result is that young voters support us. I have always said that the youth is with us. In this respect, we still have 2 or 3 years before us. If there is an election, I believe that we would win with a big difference. The latest public opinion survey confirms that we are the largest party. Public opinion surveys only reflect a cross section of opinion for a given moment in time. The true decision of the voter comes out of the ballot box.

MP Secretary General Mustafa Tasar: Perhaps the pollsters should vote in the elections rather than the citizens. Public opinion surveys always produce the results the pollsters want. One cannot move on the basis of assumptions. My advice to those who want to conduct surveys is that they join the prime minister's tours and observe the people's support on the spot. If they find

joining the prime minister's tours difficult, then I, as the secretary general, would be happy to help them. We could arrange a car for them, then they could see how the public really thinks.

If public opinion surveys truly reflected the preferences of the public then there would be no need for elections. Everyone could determine each party's voter support from some survey in CUMHURİYET or elsewhere. Then we could have elections in that manner. That is, let the pollsters hold the elections rather than the citizens. This is just a way to make money. We did not say "surveys work" before 6 November 1983. Public opinion surveys neither help us nor hurt us. The citizens know who to vote for. Such artificial surveys cannot stop that. The MP has found grass roots support no matter what they say or do. That is how it is and how it will be no matter what is said or done.

CWP leader Husamettin Cindoruk: Different surveys by different organizations produce different results. Consequently, I believe what I see and not survey results. The survey results do not reflect what I see.

CWP deputy leader Mehmet Golhan: The 10.8 percent voter support reported in your survey is less than what we had when we were not allowed to enter the elections [of 1983] and we found ourselves in the 25 March 1984 local elections. That figure is impossible. After growing so much, have we declined from the 13.4 percent support we got at that time?

We go and we see. In rural areas, in southeastern and eastern Anatolia and in small villages and towns all over Turkey, we do not see the government. We really cannot see them. Then where are the votes of the right? The disarray on the right is inconsequential. Even in this disarray, do you know how many supporters could Mehmet Yazar win over to his side? Less than 500. Even if Yazar could win over 5,000 members from a party that has 400,000 members it would not make much difference. If we lose 500, we can win back 50,000. That is why your survey results do not look very credible to me. If that figure is not peculiar to the location where the survey was held, then I ask again: Where are the votes of the right? Where have they gone?

SDPP Secretary General Mustafa Timisi: This result shows most importantly that our people want to rid themselves of the governments they have had for years and that they see the social democrats as an alternative. This is a sign of a very healthy development in the democratic process.

Our people are reaching the point where they can determine their governments with their own will. This is a very positive and encouraging development for democracy and our future. I believe that this is how these surveys must be seen and evaluated. In this situation, we, the SDPP administrators, must take steps which will match the responsibilities entrusted to us.

DLP Deputy Secretary General Yasar Mengi: I still have not read the survey results, so I cannot make any comments. Our leader is at a meeting right now, and our secretary general is in Ankara. It is impossible to give an evaluation at this time.

DLP Central Executive Council member Haluk Ozdalga declined to comment on the survey's results.

PP leader Akmet Tekdal: We do not know the conditions under which the survey was conducted. Firstly, we do not see ourselves as weak as is indicated by the survey. We see ourselves as being much stronger. We cannot evaluate the survey's results because we do not know under what conditions the survey was conducted. We believe that we can easily win 10 percent of the vote in an actual election.

Surveys may produce highly warped results because they rely on sampling methods. Consequently, we believe that such surveys not only do not reflect the truth, but also they may produce adverse results by falsely indoctrinating the public. We do not find these results realistic; they are not accurate.

NWP deputy leader Hasan Tokuslu: No matter how you look at it these surveys only cover a segment of the country. The majority of that segment may support MP or SDPP. That is why we do not believe these surveys completely. Today, it is a fact that many nationalist and idealist persons who have faith are rushing to register in our party. This traffic has intensified even more following the dissolution of NDP. We are running to win the next election. When I say "win" I mean that we are going to be represented in the Assembly with a group. We will become the government by ourselves in 10 years at most. This is our plan. Of course, we respect this survey. We are in no position to refute it, but we do not think that it truly reflects the reality. We have a voter base of 3.5 to 4 million. That means approximately one-fifth of the electorate. That translates to over 60 seats in the Assembly. This is confirmed by the number of nationalist colleagues in parties represented in the Assembly.

MP Organization Deputy Head Eyup Asik: Do not make me laugh. If your survey used the same methods and techniques used by SIAR [Social and Economic Research Center] of course you would get this result. We believe that this is a ridiculous figure. Such a result is totally impossible. We have surveys of our own. These studies show that that voter support for our party has not declined. The figure of 26.8 percent may be the result of the way the questions have been asked. We must first know what method was used.

You ask us what percentage figure we would consider normal. Given that 23.5 percent are undecided, we would consider 32 percent and above a normal figure.

Still, we respect those who conducted this survey.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

## GOALS, LEGISLATIVE LEGACY OF 12 SEPTEMBER DISCUSSED

### 12 September Goals Reviewed

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 14 May 86 p 2

["Window" column by Ilhan Selcuk: "Did 12 September Fulfill Its Purpose?"]

[Text] Some people will give a definitive answer to the question in the title of our article:

"The 12 September movement fulfilled its purpose. Because people were being killed in the streets. Now everyone can walk safely in the streets. No one is afraid of being shot in front of his doorstep."

But is this a satisfactory answer? Is there not something missing? So many things have changed since 12 September that one begins thinking:

"What was the purpose of 12 September?"

Answer:

"It was to stop terror and anarchy."

"No."

"Then what was it?"

"Its purpose was to remove the rights of strike and collective bargaining; to violate Ataturk's legacy; to restrict the freedoms granted by the 1960 Constitution; to close down the universities using Article 1402 and to establish the Higher Education Council; to implement the economics of 24 January under authoritarian rule; to impose mandatory religion classes in middle schools; to restore Greece to its former position in NATO and the Aegean; to fill the prisons with intellectuals; to make the economy dependent on large holding corporations; to establish a trusteeship democracy in Turkey; to shut down political parties; to liquidate the Republican People's Party, the People's Houses and the Turkish Language and History Institution..."

"Stop, stop there."

"Why should I stop? I am stating what was done. And that is not all."

"But are you not being unfair to 12 September? What about terror and anarchy?"

"Was it necessary to violate Ataturk's legacy to stop terror and anarchy?"

"I did not mean that."

"Which means that there were other motives. Certain forces and individuals first used terror and anarchy and then 12 September to achieve their goals."

"But did they achieve their goals?"

"They did and they did not."

"What do you mean?"

"The forces that intervened on 12 September 1980 had planned to finish the uncompleted task of 12 March and to institute a program that would remain in effect through 1990. The changes demanded by the foreign-dependent capitalism were implemented, new laws were enacted and the legal basis of the trustee democracy was established. The guided elections of 1983 guaranteed the perpetuation of the trustee regime until the end of 1988. The U.S.-backed Motherland Party became the government. The left was dealt fatal blows. From this standpoint, one could not say that 12 September did not achieve its goals."

"So what should one say?"

"One could say that some of the things in the plans of the authors of 12 September did not work out and that some of the things in its program did not turn out to be as planned."

"Such as?"

"The 12 September movement does not appear to have been successful in making the people accept the basic philosophy of the trustee democracy. Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe has upset their plans. It is hard to establish a Latin American-type military regime with a "godfather president" in a country which is a member of both the Islamic Conference and NATO. If the repressions that were risked to establish a trustee democracy result in popular dissent, those who sowed winds may harvest fires. Moreover, question marks over the economy may grow bigger."

"Is not the economy back on track?"

"Turkey's large holding companies managed to make a major leap, but they also missed an important opportunity. History will never present such an opportunity again."

"What opportunity?"

"12 September came to power with unrestricted authority with the backing of foreign-dependent capital. But instead of building a sound and reliable infrastructure (which they have termed restructuring), they built a shaky foundation. Turkey's balance of foreign payments was made to be dependent on the rise of the U.S. dollar and the devaluation of the Turkish currency rather than on increased production. Although major financial assistance was procured from overseas, imbalances were not corrected in Turkey which began paying off long-term debts through short-term borrowing. The inflation rate could not be brought under 35 percent. When a new government begins pulling the state behind the holding companies what will happen next becomes a big question."

"Such a government is a figment of imagination."

"Then the way this business has proceeded is also a figment of the imagination. How much further will they devalue the Turkish currency? How much further will the people tolerate the trusteeship democracy? The parliament is in disarray before we have arrived in 1988. Does that not prove that the 12 September program has collapsed before its time? Would parties be in such a confusion in stable regimes? Ties between the Assembly and the people are broken. The structure that resulted from the guided elections has collapsed in half the time it was expected to survive."

"The decline in oil prices and the rejuvenation of Western capitalism will have positive effects on Turkey."

"We hope so."

#### Legislation Role Analyzed

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 12-14 May 86

[Three-part series entitled "12 September and Laws" by Professor Nurkut Inan and Cuneit Ozansoy]

[12 May 86 p 6]

[Excerpt] Introduction

One of the major characteristics of the 12 September period and the subsequent tenure of the Ozal government is the intensity of legislative activities. This phenomenon led us to conduct a study which would evaluate the 12 September period from this standpoint alone. We knew from the outset that such work would go beyond the scope of a scholarly article and would perhaps necessitate a book. However, we kept our study within reasonable bounds since our goal was to give the reader an idea about the legislative activities of the 12 September period.

We chose to pursue a primarily quantitative approach which would make certain generalizations possible. We have also found it proper to present our data in tables, even if they are not complete.

We thus prepared the raw material for other researchers in this area.

## Concept of 'Legislative Activity'

By the term "legislative activity" we do not mean the process of legislation or law enactment procedures; we only mean laws and decrees with the force of law [DFL]. This work focuses on laws which were enacted by the legislative organ or the body that replaced it and which went into effect after being published in the Official Gazette and the DFLs issued by the government in accordance with the higher norms that were in effect during the period covered by this study. We did not examine lower norms such as bylaws and resolutions. The Constitution was also not included in the scope of this study. Moreover, we did not include in the quantitative analyses provisional laws that have been routinely enacted. The figures we provide below do not include the annual budget laws and laws allocating funds for salaries for mandatory military service.

Having defined the substantive scope of the laws to be studied, we classified them from two different perspectives. The first and more detailed classification was based on parts of the 1982 Constitution. The second classification, which we think is more meaningful, was based on the government's functions and duties. All laws and DFLs were included in the first classification. Because of their nature, some items included in the first classification were not included in the second classification which was based on the first classification. In other words, the second classification does embody all the laws. Only very general information was collected about the laws included in these two classifications.

This information was sufficient for our quantitative analyses. However, to perform the qualitative (content) analyses, which were necessary even if only to a limited extent, we had make a list of "fundamental laws." The contents of the laws included in this list were examined. The government's basic structure and political ideology were used as the criteria in the determination of this list. In other words, we included in this list the laws which determine the restructured form of the government and its political ideology in the aftermath of 12 September. Our study examined the contents of only these laws.

[13 May 86 p 6]

### [Excerpt] Conclusions

#### 1. General

Historically, laws at first served to strengthen and to enforce the authority they represented, but the new sociological and political dimensions added to them in time transformed their function from setting norms of specified decrees and prohibitions to seeking healthy balances in the relations between the state and a changing society.

This process, which began with the realization that humans have a concrete existence, appears to have assumed different textures in relations between individuals and political regimes. According to one writer "the historical development of the concept of law is in fact the history of the politicization



of laws." (Footnote 16) (G. Burdeau, "Essai sur L'evolution de la Loi en Droit Francais," Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique, Paris, 1939, No. 1-2, p. 50--cited from E. Tezic's "Concept of Law in Turkey According to the 1961 Constitution," Istanbul, 1972, p. 41)

Following the abandonment of the principle of pure "legality," new meanings given to man became more firmly established as a result of quests for new permutations in the triangle of man-government-law, and laws took on the role of coordinating these meanings. At this present stage reached by modern society, the individual has shed his former weakness vis a vis the state and the political regime, has won inalienable rights and guarantees through laws and has risen from the position of an object in the eyes of the state to that of a subject. (Footnote 17) (For details on this issue, see Herbert Kruger, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 2. Aufl., Stuttgart/Berlin/Koln/Mainz, 1966, p. 65)

The Turkish society has been looking for solutions to its social and political problems through constitutional actions. This quest assumed a new proportion beginning with 12 September 1980. The Turkish society was once again tested with a new constitution and a number of new fundamental laws.

The question of which social forces such radical preferences originate from and to what extent do individuals in the society agree with these preferences to form a synthesis must be asked to the authors of these arrangements and dynamics. But this is not the only issue over which questions need to be asked. It appears that laws are still seen as the only recipes for great expectations and the only scapegoats when they cannot "perform" these functions--which they should not have been assigned. Laws thus continue to be the object of a strange mentality that is not, for instance, seen in other countries. While the anger created by the reaction of a new period to the previous period makes the correct diagnosis of problems through healthy quests impossible, it also carries in itself the inevitable seeds of anger for a future period. The untiring representatives of the quest to solve all social and political problems through laws are also acting as the standard bearers of a type of legislative fetishism "by holding the fundamental laws they have established to be beyond reproach while eliminating laws enacted by others without any legal compunctions, declaring them to be cause of everything." (Footnote 18) (T. Parla, "Constitutional Change from a Legal and Political Standpoint," YENI GUNDEM Supplement 9, Istanbul, 1985, p. 65)

## 2. New Proportions Assumed by the Institution of State

### A) The New Element in the Issue of the State's Identity

The state generally wants to establish its identity in its constitution and pursues the goal of perpetuating and enforcing this identity by enacting laws that comply with the constitution.

The legislation drafted in the period beginning with 12 September 1980, has drawn a new "portrait of state" for us. What is most evident is that the 12 September movement has gone far beyond a few "corrections" and "reforms" and has built a new ideological preference in the organization of the state and its relations with individuals. The Constitution is not the only place where



this preference is framed. Legislation enacted by the National Security Council [NSC] in the period before and after the approval of the Constitution using its legislative authority continues to serve as an important source of enforcing this preference. NSC's legislative authority remained in effect until the formation of the Presidency Council of the Turkish Grand National Assembly [TGNA] after the elections. During that period, 626 laws were enacted. These include fundamental laws regarding the conduct of state and social affairs. Another characteristic of these laws, which affect such important issues, is that they cannot be voided by the Constitutional Court.

These legal arrangements are, of course, no different from other laws in terms of amendment procedures. But the fact that they cannot be taken to the Constitutional Court and consequently the fact that they cannot be declared void gives them a superiority over other laws and makes them a separate species. (Footnote 19) (See B. Tanor, "Constitutional Balance Sheet After 1980," *Yapit*, p. 14) Thus, the existence of the state is authorized not just by the Constitution, but also by a body of "superior" and "sui generis" legislation which coordinates all political and social affairs.

The story of the process of giving an "identity" to the state in the annals of public law points to the need for a "legal" identity for the state. The recognition of the state as a corporate body has not only eliminated a number of legal problems, but has also created the factor of "continuity" which is independent and different from those who govern the state. (Footnote 20) (See M. Kapani, "Introduction to Political Science," 3d Edition, 1983, pp. 21-23) However, while the granting of the status of corporate body to the state has given it continuity, it has also stipulated that those who govern the state not have any subjective rights over it and that they remain only organs which execute the authority granted to them by the laws. It is through the endorsement of this fact that we arrive at the concept of "state of law."

Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution states that the Turkish Republic is a state of the law. However, an examination of this principle in the light of the implications of the said article and beyond looking at it as a formal statement raises serious doubts about its nature. A striking picture emerges from our examination of legal arrangements: an alarming dominance of the mentality of a mystical state over basic rights and freedoms; a conflict of values between the state and the citizen and between public good and individual freedom; an ideology which elevates the state over all other values and which glorifies authority.

In the new experiment in Turkey, the principle of "restricting the political regime"—the basis of constitutionalism—has taken the form of protecting political authority and power against the people.

This reality, the essence of which is largely expressed in the first part of the Constitution, has resulted in the unquestionable dominance of a metaphysical mentality which considers the "sacred Turkish State" as a value that supersedes everything else and as a primary objective in itself. This viewpoint, which sees the state as an end in itself, reminds us of Hegel who made the state virtually an "earth god." (Footnote 21) (See E. Cassirer, "The Myth of State," Translated by Necla Arat, Istanbul, 1984, p. 252-278)

It appears that this mystical mentality, which is highly inclined to interpret opposition to the views of those who govern the state with opposition to the state, is unable to see that the function of the state can become meaningful only with the society of which it is a part. This world view, which serves to glorify "sacredness," is totally removed from the modern concept of men with inalienable rights. The last word on this issue is given by Kapani (Footnote 22) (M. Kapani, "Introduction to Political Science," 3d Edition, Ankara, 1983, p. 24): "The concept of identity is sometimes given a mystical character which is used as a cornerstone in the establishment of the idea of a state. According to this mentality, the state is an unprejudiced supreme entity which works for the good of everyone, which is completely impartial with respect to the social forces in the society and which has its own unique identity. We must state that this concept of a 'pristine state lowered from the heavens'--which is generally disseminated in authoritarian regimes--and this appearance of a bureaucratic 'supreme and impartial arbiter' is a deceptive assumption which is far from the truth."

[14 May 86 p 10]

#### B) Quest for Change in Separation of Powers

Most of the criticism leveled against the pre-1980 period was focused on the absence of a "strong executive branch." The fact that this diagnosis was one of the major themes of 12 September does not mean it was something new. Those who could not come to terms with the 1961 Constitution and who claimed that the state could not be governed with that constitution expressed their desire for a more powerful and elaborate executive branch on several previous occasions. As a result of this oft-repeated theme, the belief that the 1961 Constitution created a "helpless" executive has always had a place in the public mind. O. Aldikacti, one of the framers of the new Constitution, was a defender of this view at a seminar organized by TERCUMAN on 19 April 1980. Aldikacti said at that seminar: "The executive branch is still an organ that is doing its 'duty.' The Constitution must be changed to make the executive branch an organ that exercises its authority to execute." (Footnote 1) (O. Aldikacti, Proceedings of the TERCUMAN Seminar on the Constitution and the Electoral System, Istanbul, 1980, p. 12)

In contrast to the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution has defined the executive function not only as a "duty" but also as an "authority." In setting the scope of the executive branch, the new Constitution has replaced the phrase "within the framework of laws" with "in accordance with the Constitution and the laws." It appears that the framers of the Constitution believed that such a phrase carries in itself a meaning which can strengthen the executive branch. In our opinion this belief is not realistic. Because "in public law, duty and authority are inseparable concepts. If a duty has been assigned then the authority to perform that duty must also have been assigned. The addition of the term 'authority' to the term 'duty' does not change anything and cannot be considered as an element that strengthens the executive branch." (Footnote 2) (Y. Uler, "'Powerful Executive' in the 12 September Constitution," YENI GUNDEM Supplement 9, p. 73; also, Y. Yayla, Constitutional Law, Ankara, 1984, p. 48)

Another issue that must be considered in this connection concerns the powers granted by the Constitution to the President. With these new powers, the Presidency, which has no political responsibilities, has been elevated to an office with control authority over both the government and the parliament. According to Yayla (Footnote 3) (Yayla, *ibid.*, p. 57), these powers "strengthen the state and not the executive branch."

Another issue that must be considered in this section is that of decrees with the force of law [DFL]. The institution of DFL, introduced into our legal system with the 1971 constitutional amendments--which can be considered the beginning of the quest for a strong executive--has also been included in the 1982 Constitution with a few changes. However, the stipulation included in the old Constitution that the authority to issue DFLs can be granted for only "certain issues" has been dropped, thus expanding the boundaries of such authority and eliminating the need for disclosing the law that authorizes the issuance of DFLs. It is evident that such "uncertainties" are also seen as means of creating a powerful executive branch. The new Constitution also does not require the authorization law to "show explicitly the law provisions that will be repealed." The perils posed by such a facility may be considered alarming.

A type of DFL, which clearly strengthens the executive branch, is the "emergency DFL." These can be issued without relying on the authorization law. There are no stipulations on the issues with regard to which they can be issued, and they are beyond judicial scrutiny. In fact, no one can challenge the constitutionality of DFLs issued by the President and the Council of Ministers in emergency situations, such as in times of martial law or war. One can pass easier judgement on this issue when one remembers that emergency situations in Turkey are considered "normal."

Moreover, the approach of the current political regime to the DFL issue has already assumed alarming proportion. The large number of DFLs that have been issued indicate that the legislative function has shifted to the executive branch and that, although the DFLs were designed as an exception, they have virtually become the rule. DFLs 174 and 202 which set the principles of establishment and the duties of the ministries are an interesting example. The principle stated at the beginning of the Constitution that "supremacy rests only in the Constitution and the laws" has been completely disregarded. One striking feature of the DFLs is the carelessness with which they have been prepared. For example, Article 140/3 of the Constitution states: "The status, appointment, rights, duties, salaries and compensation of judges and prosecutors will be [determined by law] in accordance with principles guaranteeing the impartiality and independence of the courts." DFLs 241 and 243, however, have openly set the financial rights of the judiciary.

### C) New Position of Judiciary

The principle known as separation of powers no longer embodies the separation of the executive and legislative branches in its former rigid sense in view of the fact that the executive branch is generally controlled by the party which has a majority in the parliament. However, one principle that has not been invalidated is that of the independence of the judiciary branch from the other



two branches. In Turkey, those who defended the thesis that the executive branch must be strengthened, believed in a sense that such a change would entail the weakening of the judiciary and the control of the judiciary by the executive. The following views expressed at a seminar on the 1961 Constitution are interesting: "The biggest fault I see in our Constitution is this: The Constitution embodies neither a soft nor a hard separation of powers. The Constitution has established a hierarchy of powers at the top of which sits the judiciary branch. Everyone knows that the state and the body politic have existed without a judiciary since ancient times. Therefore, we can say theoretically that it is possible to have a society where the judicial function is not performed by the state and that this has happened in history." (Footnote 4) (M. Ozyoruk, Proceedings of the TERCUMAN Seminar on the Constitution and the Electoral System, Istanbul, 1980, p. 84)

Evidently, the new arrangements made with regard to the judiciary will largely end the "complaints" brought against it. The Constitution and the laws affecting the judiciary branch have largely turned over this branch of the state to the control of the executive branch, thus making the assertion of the claim of "independence" impossible.

The new structure is largely based on legislation enacted before the approval of the Constitution. Law No. 2461 on the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors; Law No. 2556 on Judges and Prosecutors; Law No. 2568 on the Supreme Military Administrative Court; Law No. 2575 on the Council of State, Law No. 2576 on the Establishment and Duties of Regional Administrative, Administrative and Tax Courts; and Law No. 2577 on Administrative Trial Methods can be mentioned in this connection. During the time NSC's legislative authority continued after the approval of the Constitution, it enacted Law No. 2797 on the Supreme Court of Appeals; Law No. 2802 on Judges and Prosecutors; Law No. 2845 on the Establishment and Trial Methods of State Security Courts; and Law No. 2949 on the Establishment and Trial Methods of the Constitutional Court. These laws cannot be voided by the Constitutional Court.

Among these, Law No. 2461 on the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, enacted by NSC on 13 May 1981, is of special significance. In effect, this law empowers a council headed by the Minister of Justice and attended by his undersecretary to make final decisions on personal and disciplinary matters related to members of the judiciary. Although this law stipulates that this function be performed "in accordance with principles guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of the courts" (Article 1) and that the council be independent (Article 3), it is hard to believe them in view of the composition of the council. In fact, according to Article 159 of the law, the council's voting and alternate members, other than the Minister of Justice and his undersecretary, will be appointed by the President. According to the last paragraph of the law, the Minister of Justice is empowered to assign judges and prosecutors to other provisional duties if he deems it necessary. Moreover, the decisions of this council cannot be appealed in the courts. This Supreme Council is also empowered to select the nonmilitary members of the Council of State, the Supreme Court of Appeals, the Court of Disputes.

The move away from the cooption method stipulated by the 1961 Constitution for the selection of high court members is one of the most distinct features of

the new legislation on the judiciary branch. Since all members of the Constitutional Court will also be appointed by the President, high court members are completely left under the influence of the executive branch. It is now more realistic to talk about the "judiciary" branch as a variation of the executive branch than to see it as an impartial and independent "power."

It is evident that the political regimes' desire to integrate the government with the state and to monopolize the power of making political decisions without the intervention of any other power is at the root of their dissatisfaction with and opposition to judicial oversight. (Footnote 5) (For details see A. Unsal, "Politics and the Constitutional Court," Ankara, 1980, p. 129)

#### From Pluralist Democracy to Restricted Democracy

Some of the reasons of existence of the new legislation are: To establish an authoritarian form of government, to enforce the concept that the state supersedes everything and to approach and "evaluate" individuals and society in accordance with their compliance with the "values" mentioned above. To state that the 1982 Constitution is a constitution of reaction like the 1961 Constitution would be nothing new. However, to determine the state's "view" of the individual it is essential to determine this reaction clearly. It can be said that the driving force behind the founding regime's move to draft a new constitution and a complementary set of laws around it was not just a desire to rationalize the machinery of the state but, more importantly, to remove the obstacles that blocked (or that was believed to block) that machinery and to build a new model of human and political culture.

What were those obstacles?

Extraparliamentary social groups, associations, labor unions, independent organizations intervening in the political decision making process; the judicial branch which interfered with the work the executive branch and which immobilized it; and individual liberties which carried with them an anti-authority meaning.

The new Constitution mentions rights and freedoms, but immediately afterwards enumerates the restrictions on each of them and states the circumstances under which they could be suspended. It thus believes that every right and freedom can potentially threaten "the indivisible territorial and national integrity of the state." The entire text of the Constitution is inundated with the idea that the principle of a democratic state can be upheld "for the people" but "despite the people."

One can easily see the model man stipulated by these approaches: A silent person who is afraid of any new ideas, who views the world from a single narrow window and who does not ask new and unnecessary questions about the essence of the truth that has already been "found" and "given" to him or about what it should be.

In conclusion, this restructuring aimed at building a new model of man and culture has made a clear choice with regard to the meaning and purpose of



democracy: A participatory and pluralist democracy means upsetting democracy; it drags political life and the country into chaos and leaves behind a degeneration which shakes the foundations of the state.

This view finds it impossible to accept that the people can govern themselves (or even can participate in government), sees the people's role in politics as only the election of those who will govern them, favors as narrow a political field as possible and believes that democracy has a chance of surviving only in such an atmosphere. It thus sees social pressure groups and the entity of "political participation" as factors which degenerate politics and considers the minimization of the political function of the people essential for the operation of the system. (Footnote 6) (For detailed information on this issue see M. Kapani, "Some New Views and Debates in the Theory of Democracy," B. N. Esen Commemorative Volume, Ankara, 1977, pp. 205-219)

Such an approach to democracy must not look alien or new to us. There have been many individuals and parties in Turkish politics who for years wanted to elevate the "national will" and to leave politics to the politicians only and who insisted that a situation to the contrary would "immobilize the executive branch." Today, these desires have finally been fulfilled and "reinforced" with legal arrangements. The practice of politics has been transformed from a collective activity into an individual one. The liberal mentality of defining democracy as a "democracy of associations" has been purged from the laws and an ethic of "good conduct" has been introduced. This ethic sees individuals as units which are cast from the same block and which share the same common mystical goals and requires them to comply with the existing political values.

Article 33/4 of the Constitution states: "Associations cannot pursue political goals, cannot be involved in political activities, cannot receive support from and cannot support political parties and cannot collaborate with labor unions, professional organizations with the status of public institution and foundations for such objectives."

This mentality appears to be ingrained in virtually all laws. The Constitution contains a similar and repetitive provision for labor unions. Law No. 2821 on Labor Unions which was enacted on 5 May 1983 separately bars political goals, political activities and "collaboration with any political parties over any issue" for labor unions.

The political prohibition applies to all professional organizations which have the status of public institution. Article 135/3.4 of the Constitution bars professional organizations from getting involved in politics and collaborating with political parties, labor unions and associations. This prohibition has been fully preserved in the bylaws of the professional organizations. Those who are barred from any political activities also include university faculty and students.

In conclusion, the 1982 Constitution and other fundamental laws have restricted the political forum to a very narrow field and have become the basis of the process now known as "depoliticization." The satisfaction of the current political regime with this situation was expressed by one Minister of State as follows: "Our Constitution embodies a definitive prohibition on the

political activities of associations, labor unions and professional organizations. In other words, the depoliticization of these organizations is mandated by the Constitution. Like the overwhelming majority of our nation, the Motherland Party finds this arrangement beneficial for the political stability of our country and supports it. The experiences of the past have clearly shown how excessive politicization can lead the country to polarization and then to anarchy." (Footnote 7) (Mesut Yilmaz's statement, CUMHURIYET).

This statement must be a reflection of the elitist mentality which has shifted the fundamental values of democracy to "balance" and "stability." This approach, which does not consider the political participation process an essential and enriching part of democracy and which sees the people's participation in the political process through various means a cause of the degeneration of democracy, is in search of a man who is faithful to the traditional cliches and the system of authority. Time will show whether such a mentality of democracy "despite the people" and "without the people" has any chance of being implemented in a country with as rapidly-changing social dynamics as Turkey.

9588

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

#### ECEVIT ON DISINCENTIVES TO LASTING DEMOCRACY

Ankara YANKI in Turkish No 780 10-16 Mar 86 pp 11-13

[Article by former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit: "Reform Cobblers"; Note: the Turkish word for "revolution" is also used for "reform." Where "reform" occurs in this article, the author used the word in English]

[Excerpts] Certain civilian sectors, both left and right, have been far more responsible than the military for the military interventions in Turkey.

Certain powerful right-wing sectors are afraid that the people, through development, will change the balance of society and gain more say. To prevent this from happening to them, they work it around to get the military involved in politics and clamp down on the people by means of the military. They do not hesitate to stir up unrest or even armed confrontations if necessary to pull the military into political matters. In this way, they fan the interventionist tendency of the military, though its major concern is security.

Even if certain sectors on the left which describe themselves as "progressive" or "revolutionary intellectuals" seem to desire the strengthening of the people, they actually want to protect and increase their own power which is rooted in the elitist traditions of society.

The commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, strengthened by economic change, are rapidly abrading the traditional domination of the sector called the "progressive-revolutionary intellectuals" which aspires to the "leadership cadre" and are beseiging the tower of bureaucracy, which is the mainstay of this sector. Those commercial and industrial bourgeoisie are now in command of even "national education." Panicked by this, the "progressive-revolutionary intellectuals," where they ought to unite with the people to strengthen them, always pin their hopes on the military and mobilize the military instead. Some of the leaders of this sector, if not the entire sector, are still of this mind.

They, like certain dominant forces on the right, occasionally incite the army to intervene or wait for certain "revolutionary" saviors in the army to come forward and, indeed, encourage them to.

This kind of "revolutionism" is "revolutionism for the people in spite of the people." They think that the people are reactionary, opposed to change and cannot understand their own interests and that, for those reasons, a

revolution for the people cannot be conducted with the help of the people. Or, more precisely, this is the kind of excuse they use to deceive themselves for the sake of maintaining their "leadership cadre" positions and their pride.

Certainly, it is contradictory that certain rightists as well as leftists, or conservatives as well as "revolutionaries" in the upper strata of society flirt with the military. When the army enters politics, it cannot be close to either one or the other of these opposing forces.

Then what is the army's position?

There is an answer to this which may be valid, not just for Turkey, but for the world at large. All the armies of the world are, usually, conservative. The reason for this is rooted in their functions and their nature, because the army, whose primary function is security and which is most sensitive to security concerns, will be worried about the security aspects of the inevitable upheaval in a society in a process of rapid change and seeking new balances. A society in which everyone sits still and quiet in his designated place would be much more appealing to the army. So, the army would like to see in society the discipline and orderly hierarchy that is necessary and applicable to itself.

Armies, however, may be "progressive" in cases where the society is very backward and behind the times. Or rather, they may seem to be "progressive," because an army must keep up with modern technology and adjust to certain modern institutions in order to perform its defense and security duties adequately. In meeting its own requirements in this regard, the army also contributes to the modernization and advancement of society. But, after social development and change gain a certain momentum, the army gradually falls behind society as regards social, political and economic views, if not technologically. And, it will not be very happy with a democracy which enables society to act as it sees fit, especially if democracy is not yet firmly in place or has not reached the point to be functioning healthily.

So, when that stage is reached, the army is forced, from the standpoint of the well-being of both the army and society, to sever all links to politics. Otherwise, it can neither safeguard democracy nor keep up with the natural process of social development and change.

But, certain "progressive-revolutionary intellectuals" in Turkey either do not see this fact or do not want to see it. Even if they understand that they cannot get the entire army, especially the upper ranks, on their side, they count on the lower and middle ranks and cannot help but get their hopes up.

On that score, in interpreting our recent history also, they deceive themselves, being obsessed by certain misconceptions.



For example, they think it is "Ataturkism" or a requirement of "Kemalism" to involve the military in politics and try to draw certain segments of the armed forces or the army into political machinations. Yet, they feign ignorance of how Mustafa Kemal struggled, even while a young and fiery officer, to keep the military out of politics and was scorned for it by the military leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, assigned to ineffective and deadend posts.

They feign ignorance of how important it was to Ataturk during the War of Independence to take his strength from the people rather than the army and to get the idea across, especially to world public opinion, that he got his power from the people.

They feign ignorance of how Ataturk took the most progressive steps in our history when he civilianized the administration after the Republic was established and, while a lot of "irregulars" in many Western countries were putting on marshal's uniforms, Ataturk took off the uniform he had won on the battlefield, not even wearing it on ceremonial occasions, and subordinated the general staff, headed by a full marshal, to a civilian defense minister.

These "progressive-revolutionary intellectuals," who insist on deceiving themselves, also misinterpret the 27 May 1980 intervention and believe that democracy was saved by the army intervention in 1960.

Yet, a totalitarian order the likes of which the world has never seen had been readied for Turkey through the "national and cultural unity" project which had been prepared at that time and brought to the brink of implementation, and this ploy was only just quashed by certain civilian forces which saw the danger in time and reacted, only in this way enabling the transition to democracy.

However, some "revolutionary democrats" like to play military and feign ignorance of this and evaluate the 27 May intervention as "right" and the 12 March and 12 September interventions as "wrong."

Actually, one of the most authoritative voices during the 12 September 1980 period has said that these three interventions did not differ in fundamentals and goals. It has been stated publicly that the three interventions had the same purpose, but the first two had some "gaps" left in them and certain politicians who took advantage of the gaps were able to prevent accomplishment of the goals, whereas, after the 12 September intervention, no "gaps" were left and, therefore, the goal was achieved.

The "progressive-revolutionary-democratic intellectuals" also deceived themselves incredibly as to the "reformist" aspect of the 12 March intervention.

Yet, the top military person at the very outset of the intervention described the basic reason for it as social awareness getting ahead of the economy. The president at the time, meanwhile, did not even use the word "reform" in listing the goals and rationales for the intervention during his first meeting with party leaders.



Such descriptions and assertions showed clearly that the basic goal was to curb an aroused society. But, although society could not be curbed, certain of the "progressive-revolutionary-democratic intellectuals" who thought they were so smart were curbed for a while. However, they seemed to revive a few weeks later when the famous "sledge hammer" operation started foundering.

I cannot say they "revived," but I can say they "seemed to revive" because some comments made about them in the memoirs and research published in recent months in connection with the 12 March period show that many people in that group have still not been roused from the torpor of the "revolutionary" soporific.

This being the case, if the 12 March intervention could have been conducted by this cadre of the army (or junta), not that one, all the necessary "reforms," "revolutions," could have been realized and a "Kemalist" order could have been established in Turkey:

/These persons, who would let no one else in on the defense of "democracy" and the "legal state," were in such a daze that they could consider the "Revolutionary Council" which the junta in that intervention was planning as a replacement for the Turkish Grand National Assembly and even the "revolutionary courts" with which it decided to replace the independent judiciary to be requirements of "revolutionism," Atatürkism and even of "democratism"/ [in boldface].

One day while people were still seeing dreams of "reform" in the shadow of the bayonet of 12 March, I was walking through a market near Ulus Square in Ankara when a sign caught my eye: A shoemaker had changed the name of his store to "Reform Cobbler."

Naturally, as time passed and the dreams of "reform" collapsed, that sign also came down.

But there is still no shortage of "reform cobblers" among the "progressive-revolutionary-democratic intellectuals."

As long as this sector, which has considerable influence on society, fails to rid itself completely of its fantasies of boots-and-bayonets revolutionism and to realize that the only way to accomplish reform to benefit the people or a change of order is through integration with the people, Turkish society will not easily attain democracy without boots and bayonets.

As long as certain civilian minds, whether left or right, are not civilianized, the regime cannot be as civilianized as it should, either.

8349

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MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

SIMULATORS FOR TRAINING PROVIDED--Thomson-CSF will supply the German Army, in cooperation with Krauss-Maffei, with 22 simulators for training in tank driving. These simulators will be equipped with VISA 4 computerized image-processing system. [Text] [Milan PANORAMA DIFESA in Italian No 25, Apr-May p 10] [COPYRIGHT: 1986 Printed in Italy. ED.A.I. s.r.l.] 8600/6662

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MILITARY

NORWAY

#### CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT TO MEAN TIGHTER FUNDS FOR MILITARY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Much Concern About Reduced Defense Capacity"; first paragraph is boldfaced lead-in in original; words between slantlines are italicized in original]

[Text] The most optimistic estimate indicates that the change of government has cost the Defense Forces 260 million kroner during the present year alone. But in this computation no allowance was made for the possibility that price increases and inflation may soon turn out to be considerably greater than the government wishes.

Nor does the computation take into account any other retrenchments, budget reductions, or political directives concerning management of the Defense Forces which involve new and increased outlays.

It is still not known if the new government will promote political initiatives in such a direction, but there is much concern about whether the country's defense capacity will be significantly impaired in the days to come.

Devaluation of the krone right after the change of government cost the Defense Forces an additional 185 million kroner in expenditures, inasmuch as current contracts for materiel are settled in dollars, German marks, and Swedish kronor. No compensation has been given for this real reduction in the budget--and it presumably also means a weakened defense capacity. Afterwards the government reduced the budget by 0.5 percent from what was planned for this year, i.e., by 75 million kroner. This comes to 260 million kroner altogether.

#### Significant Sums

Half a percent does not sound like much, but percentage computation is a useful political tool when it comes to reversing a trend in political priorities. Only on the face of it, moreover, is half a percent a small amount of money. In reality, significant sums are hidden here. It can be mentioned, for example, that in the course of 5 years, which is the Defense Forces' plan period, half a percent adds up to 1.2 billion kroner. This is roughly what it costs to equip one of the field brigades. People are also worried that the government is considering several "hidden" reductions in the defense budget in the form of political

directives for the management of the Defense Forces. Such directives mean a cost increase more often than not and tend to "eat up" funds which could be used to improve the defense capacity.

In this connection, it is the shades of the 1970s which cause concern. That is when there came a series of similar political directives which did not improve our defense capacity, and at the same time the budget swelled up enormously and created the /impression/ that substantial funds were being used to defend the country. We can mention, for example, costly welfare measures, implementation of the Work Environment Law, buildup of the Coast Guard, establishment of a Coast Guard base in Sortland, formation of a UN contingent, expansion of the NIKE system (there had been a proposal to dismantle it), and establishment of the rescue squadron.

#### Undermines Defense Capacity

These are all measures and reforms which may very well be to the liking of this or that group as political goals, but there is no way to get around the fact that each political directive of the type mentioned helps to undermine the country's defense capacity when no compensation is given.

The new government has also decided that the UN contingent in Lebanon will be kept there indefinitely. The previous government had announced a plan for reducing the UN contingent, and some persons in the Defense Forces visualized substantial amounts of money saved which could be used to buy sorely needed materiel. Instead there will continue to be an outlay of /at least/ 100 million kroner a year.

#### May Be Costlier

The bill for UN involvement in southern Lebanon may soon prove to be a lot bigger than we have been led to believe up until now. In the United States there is skepticism about the contingent, and there have been signals that Washington is reappraising its financial support. Altogether, the UN contingent costs 250 million kroner a year. Even though some of it is covered by the UN, we have here a significant item of expenditure if the government hits upon the idea of redistributing the expenditures among Norwegian cabinet ministries at the same time as the U.S. government reduces its contribution.

In such a case, the defense budget could in reality easily be reduced by 1.0-1.5 percent.

12327

CSO: 3639/126



MILITARY

SPAIN

BRIEFS

SPAIN CHOOSES SUPER-PUMA--Unexpectedly, when the purchase of 24 Agusta AB412 helicopters had almost been taken for granted, the Spanish Ejercito di Tierra announced that they had placed an order for 18 Aerospatiale Super-Pumas with a contract amounting to FF1,000 million. Spain has already over 20 Puma and Super-Puma helicopters. [Text] [Mila PANORAMA DIFESA in Italian No 25, Apr-May 86] [COPYRIGHT: 1986 Printed in Italy. ED.A.I. s.r.l] 8600/6662

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# NEW KRAUSS MAFFEI CHAIRMAN PREDICTS SLUMP WILL LAST TO 1989

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 14 May 86 p 15

[Article by gw: "Strong Order Decline in Military Engineering Sector Causes the Greatest Concern"]

[Text] HANDELSBLATT, Tuesday May 13. Munich--Burkhard Wollschlaeger took his difficult office as the new chairman of the board of Krauss Maffei AG (KM), Munich, during an order slump. Even in fiscal 1985, the company only broke even, for the net income of DM 0.1 million is earmarked for the guaranteed dividend of 16.1 percent to the 3.6 percent of small stockholders. The slump would continue until 1989, Wollschlaeger predicted.

Since business in military engineering is on a strong downturn and the high export fraction of 65.9 percent in the sales of the 1985 civilian program of DM 464 (382) million is being curbed by the present low dollar exchange rate, only the greatest of efforts would make it possible just to break even in the current year of 1986. Wollschlaeger therefore announced cost savings of around DM 30 million, the effect of which would not be reflected in profits before 1987, however. For this reason, a slight profit at best might be achieved no earlier than next year.

In view of the fact that deliveries this year in the tank business will most likely head toward zero after the last Leo 2 shipment to the Army in March 1987, a reduction by probably 250 to 300 can hardly be avoided in the present workforce of the KM-group numbering 5108 (in the previous year: 4942). Order decline in the KM-group, whose sales still rose slightly by 3.6 percent to DM 2 (1.93) billion, was rather dramatic in 1985 with a minus of 31.2 percent down to DM 1.28 (1.87) billion. In civilian transactions, orders declined by 25 percent and in military transactions, where it was possible to almost maintain the volume of business with DM 1.54 billion, incoming orders dropped by 35 percent down to DM 859 million.

This negative order trend continued to the end of April 1986--though structured slightly differently: Orders in the civil program indeed rose vigorously by 29.3 percent to DM 172 million, but the decline in the military industry even intensified to a minus 46.5 percent, meaning that incoming orders so far were almost cut in half as compared to an already weak 1985, down to DM 191 (357) million.

Wollschlaeger therefore is hoping for the sixth lot for fighter tank Leopard 2 from the Army, which should come in the third quarter of 1986 if production is to start in the beginning of 1988. Of the 150 Leo 2, 83 tanks would be assigned to KM, so that 5 (at present 15) tanks would then be assembled. Of the total order volume of DM 750 million, the Munich group would receive a scant DM 400 million.

Thus Krauss Maffei started the current year 1986 with an order backlog that had diminished by more than one third down to DM 1.69 (2.6) billion: During the first four months sales increased further by 11.7 percent to DM 679 million, with military engineering rising by 9.1 percent to DM 547 million and civil transactions by 23.4 percent, even to DM 132 million, thanks primarily to the transportation engineering sector as a result of locomotive shipments to Turkey. For the entire year of 1986 the chairman anticipates sales of DM 1.7 billion in round figures, about DM 1.3 billion of which will still go to military engineering.

Last but not least, with the tail wind of Leo 2 shipments to the Netherland army last year's export fraction rose to 48.3 (1984: 46.2) percent. In the civil program it even reached 65.9 (56.3) percent. Actually, the only money-makers for Krauss Maffei were military engineering and somewhat the business sector "Foundry and Forge," where sales rose to DM 66 (59) million.

All other civilian business sectors--plastics technology with DM 280 (236) million sales, process engineering with DM 79 (83) million sales and transportation technology with DM 69 (34) million sales--operated more or less in the red. Wollschlaeger believes process engineering, which is greatly dependent upon chemistry, to be the most likely prospect to be caught up in an increased number of orders bringing the bottomline back into the black.

After expiration of the profit transfer agreement with Buderus taxes related to income are reported for the first time in the financial statement: The meager DM 1.86 million indicate that Krauss Maffei did not make any money and should have had to pay hardly any corporate income tax. Total sales and operating revenues at the corporation did increase by 10.6 percent, but at the same time inventories of finished and unfinished products clearly increased by roughly DM 43 million. Cost of material climbed by 10.6 percent, increasing its share to 77.5 (76.8) percent, while personnel expenses rose by 6.7 percent to DM 286 million, corresponding to a share of 15.8 (16.2) percent in total cost and operating revenues. This signals a low manufacturing depth which according to Wollschlaeger should be slightly increased by reducing certain outside services. This, of course, is but one of several remedies. Capital investments as well, which last year with DM 29.7 (27.1) million were on the same level as write-offs, are to be increased, not the least of reasons being to straighten out to some degree the "patchwork quilt" of production facilities. In Cincinnati/USA, a branch plant for injection-molding machines will be erected for DM 23 million employing about 60 workers.

Of course, Krauss Maffei also has to offer a few new products: In addition to the air defense system "wildcat" on a wheel carriage to be tested by the Saudis with the approval of Bonn, a technically advanced multipurpose weapons carrier ACV comprised of standard components and costing less than previous

systems of this type, as well as the airplane towing system PTS. In 1985, expenses for research and development were in the range of DM 76 million. But one of the major weak points is excessively low equity share of only 7.9 per-cent. This is to be improved somewhat with the creation of additional authorized capital in the amount of DM 8.125 million at the annual meeting of shareholders on June 20.

13011/5915

CSO: 3620/721



ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION OF IVG MANAGEMENT COMPANY PLANNED

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 16-17 May 86 p 24

[Article by rlb: "45 Percent of Capital Shall Be Widely Disposed of Starting September 1986"]

[Text] HANDELSBLATT, Thursday 15 May 86--Arrangements are in place for partial privatization of a very successful government company, the Industrieverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH (IVG), Bonn. The company, previously wholly owned by the government, according to cabinet resolution of 12 Mar 86 is to be partially privatized in such a manner that starting September 1986, 45 percent of the capital shall be widely disposed of, including the issuance of employee shares as well.

As mentioned by the two IVG-managers, Hans-Georg von Koester and Dr Guenter Nastelski, in a press interview, the IVG is planning to approve in mid-June 1986 the financial statement 1985, at the same time converting the company into a corporation (new name: Industrieverwaltungsgesellschaft AG--IVG AG) and increasing the capital from 75 million DM to 110 million DM by reversal of declared reserves. The government will retain a majority of 55 percent of the stock, while the remaining 45 percent of shares shall be sold widely dispersed.

The issue price for the new shares--as was emphasized by the new management--had no more been determined yet than the fact that it is by no means certain whether the bank consortium will indeed give the green light for the issue of shares as early as September. Because the exact date for the listing on the stock exchange should essentially depend upon the prevailing stock market climate.

In the opinion of the IVG-management this solution found by the government essentially signifies the following:

1. The IVG with all its subsidiaries remains intact as a group. No losses of value will result, which would have been unavoidable in the event of a sale of individual company divisions.
2. Self-sufficiency, economic independence and also the neutrality of the group are being retained.

3. The partial privatization accommodates the regulatory policy concepts of the federal government, IVG, on the one hand, fulfills public responsibilities, but on a large scale also makes strictly private transactions.

4. The public responsibilities in the parent company--particularly the administration of national crude oil reserves in the salt caverns of Etzel--as well as in a number of subsidiaries are being retained. The IVG is now and shall remain the company geared toward executing special assignments for the FRG at all times. IVG's special attraction for private investors as well will be the very fact that a healthy blend of strictly private transactions and fulfillment of public orders will continue to be the basis of economic activities of the company.

Since IVG-management has determined that this company is not too well known, they will shortly start an extensive nationwide advertising drive similar to the campaigns undertaken by Viag at the six German stock exchanges in order to generate information and a basis of trust for the stock exchange listing. IVG-management thinks it is entirely possible that the listing on the stock exchange might not occur before next year.

Management is convinced (even the corporation has only two board members) that it can successfully continue its business policies following the partial privatization. "We are confident that the private capital will generate a number of incentives for our future work and it is our conviction that in the time ahead we shall also service the increased capital with the traditional IVG dividend of at least 12 percent, this is our minimum goal."

For fiscal 1984 a dividend of 9 million DM was distributed to the government. Management now estimates that the dividend for 1985 will increase "considerably" to 13.2 million DM. Net profits should be in excess of 20 million DM this time compared to 15.6 million DM in the previous year.

Approximately 25 percent of operating results are derived from the transportation sector, 10 percent from tank inventory and the remainder from real estate. For 1985, sales of 560 (530) million DM are being anticipated within the group. The IVG-group has a workforce of 4300 and during the past five years about 350 million DM were invested.

With regard to the real estate sector of IVG, says Hans-Georg von Koester, there is no concern at all. With more than 90 percent, the leasing level is still very favorable although it is getting more difficult all the time to rent the older facilities. But in 1985 the operating result in the real estate sector should improve by 10 percent as compared to the previous year.

With regard to the publicly discussed matter of the so-called sensitive IVG subsidiaries Von Koester commented that the responsibilities of these companies can be exercised in the same manner as before within the framework of a partially privatized IVG. And regarding the special order from the cabinet via the Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft mbH (IABG), Ottobrunn, a final cabinet decision is expected within the near future.

Given the cabinet resolution of 12 Mar 86 and the comments made to management by the federal government there would seem no doubt but that the IABG will

remain within the structure of the IVG-group. The concern here is that the IABG, in which the aeronautics and aerospace industry holds a 26 percent interest, continues to remain, even as an affiliate of a partially privatized IVG, a neutral instrument of the federal government, neutral especially toward the companies in the aeronautics and aerospace industry.

13011/5915

CSO: 3620/722

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

BUSINESS RESEARCH INSTITUTE: ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS DOWN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Jun 86 p 10

[Article: "Finland Falling Behind Other Industrial Nations: ETLA Predicts Loss of 36,000 Jobs in Industry"]

[Text] Total production in Finland will grow at an annual rate of 2.5 percent by the end of this decade, predicts the Business Research Institute (ETLA). Annual growth will remain the same as in years past, so that no actual decline will be experienced. Finland is falling behind the other industrial nations in economic growth, because total production in those countries increases 3.5 percent annually on the average.

The other Western industrial nations benefit from cheaper oil more than Finland does, since Finland must struggle to extricate itself from its problems with exports to the Soviet Union. ETLA predicts that the period of adjustment will be painful in many spheres and regions.

The shipyard and sawmill industries are the really critical areas. Growth will also be slow in the textile, garment, leather, and shoe industries, forecasts ETLA in its appraisal "Outlook for Growth in the National Economy 1986-1990."


Industry in particular will lose jobs during the 5-year period. ETLA estimates that the structural change will devour 36,000 industrial jobs.

ETLA nevertheless finds comfort in the fact that the lower oil bill will benefit Finland before long.


"Total production will not exactly increase, but the effects on inflation and national income will be positive," says Pentti Vartia, ETLA's managing director.

In its appraisal, ETLA is confident that the price of oil will remain \$15 a barrel until the end of 1988, and the price should rise to \$20 before the close of the decade. It is estimated on this basis that the worst of the slowdown in exports to the Soviet Union will occur next year. ETLA assumes that the trade surplus with the Soviets will return to the framework of its credit limit by the end of 1990.

Exports to the West had begun to fall off even before oil became cheaper. ETLA offers evidence that price competitiveness is now too weak for Finland to be able



ETLA's appraisal of both exports to the Soviet Union and the price of crude oil rests on computation number two. The biggest reduction in exports to the Soviet Union will take place next year if the price of oil stays at \$15 a barrel.



to properly capture shares of the market. The institute believes, however, that the competitiveness trend can gradually be reversed.

#### Labor Supply Decreasing

ETLA estimates that at the end of the decade the unemployment level will be 6.4 percent, or 170,000 persons on the average will be out of work. It is still worthwhile to choose a profession in the service industries, because there the job opportunities are getting better and better.

The change in the demographic structure is already starting to be seen in forecasts: before the end of the decade, the labor supply may increase by roughly 50,000 individuals, which is only about one-third of the previous 5-year period's supply.



"The success of businesses will vary considerably from one field of activity to the next. During this period, for example, the volume growth of metals is predicted to be 4 percent, while growth in the textile area will remain half a percentage point," says ETLA researcher Timo Airaksinen.

Industry's outlays for research and product development, or so-called soft investments, have tripled during the last 10 years. ETLA believes that their share will continue to grow, because various tempting opportunities for risk financing will be created as the capital markets evolve.

#### Economic Policy Favors Consumption

The current combination of monetary and financial policy came in for criticism last month in ETLA's survey of market conditions. In the institute's opinion, economic policy excessively favors consumption at the expense of investments, especially when the interest rate is kept high. An increase in consumption is not considered bad as such, but over the long haul, in ETLA's view, it is not a stable way to maintain demand.

ETLA believes that interest rates will now decline at the start of the period of critical examination, because inflation has slowed down and the Bank of Finland does not need to combat it through a policy of high interest rates. The domestic interest rate nevertheless still remains higher than the international one.

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CSO: 3617/124

ECONOMIC

GREECE

# OVERSTAFFED CIVIL SERVICE RANKS RAPPED

Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 5 Jun 86 pp 42-44

[Article by Tina Polit1]

[Excerpts] The total labor force in Greece is 3,810,000 people. In other words, this many men and women are able to work, whether they work or not. Of these, 127,801 are employed in 17 ministries!

Another 173,000 work in public organizations and enterprises. In other words, more than 300,000 Greeks are working permanently in the public sector. What work are they doing? Of the 127,801 working in the 17 ministries, 25,582 are messengers! Yes, that is, 25 percent.... It is worth it, however, for us to have a clear picture of the number of those working in the ministries, public organizations and enterprises:

<u>Ministry</u>	<u>Number of Workers</u>
Interior	11,959
Defense	21,191
Health-Welfare	10,127
Finance	17,668
Agriculture	18,638
Housing, Environment, Planning and Public Works	12,940
Justice	7,546
Culture	5,422
Communications	4,593
To Prime Minister	4,268
Education	4,789
Foreign Affairs	2,126
National Economy	2,378
Commerce	1,775
Labor	839
Industry	917
Merchant Marine	625

Public Enterprise - OrganizationNumber of Workers

OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization]	30,620
DEI [Public Power Corporation]	29,379
IKA [Social Insurance Foundation]	18,618
OAS [Urban Communications Organization]	14,661
OSE [Railways Organization of Greece]	14,567
OLYMPIC	11,681
ELTA [Greek Posts]	10,100
OLP [Piraeus Port Authority]	5,500
EVDAP [Capital Area Water Supply and Drainage Company]	4,968
OAED [Labor Force Employment Organization]	3,351
EAV [Greek Aircraft Industry]	3,224
ERT [Greek Radio and Television]	2,248
EVO [Greek Arms Industry]	1,450
IGME [Institute for Geological and Mineral Research]	1,300
OLTh [Salonica Port Authority]	1,293
PROIN ESSO	1,198
Labor Hearth	1,156
Tobacco Institute	1,086

Now, how much these employees, among whom only the permanent, not the contract and remaining employees have been counted, costs is an amount which has been budgeted for 1985 at 215 billion drachmas. Even so, the 215 billion drachmas are destined for wages of the public's civilian personnel. That is, the wages of soldiers are not included in this amount. The interesting thing, in the case in question, is that, of the 215 billion, 84 billion relate to the basic pay while 131 billion concern benefits, additional payments, etc. which boost the basic salary.

The variety and high amount of the various benefits is one of the reasons why Greeks adore working for the public sector.

Now, much has been written about the productivity of public employees and it is not expedient to refer to it here.

There are people who literally work themselves to death because by themselves they have assumed many responsibilities; conversely, there are others who just sit because they have nothing to do.

When there is an excessively large number of workers not being put to productive use and without a program of new activities which could engross the idle ones, the deficits increase.

For example, in a public company, 80 percent of the business goes for wages. For this company to be healthy, this percentage should be 28 to 35 percent of its business. With such a gap the company, if it were private, would have closed. It operates, however, as a public company, because the state pays. In other words, we pay.

The majority of the appointments in the civil service are favors bestowed by those governing at the time.

Public personalities, whether at work or at home, at the most improbable hours, get telephone calls concerning the most improbable subjects which have one common goal: getting appointed.

And, of course, do not say what unemployment does.

Many of those who seek an appointment already have work in the private sector or even the civil service! In the latter case, they are seeking a transfer to some more privileged vehicle than that in which they are working!

9247

CSO: 3521/176

ECONOMIC

GREECE

#### BRIEFS

LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS--According to our authoritative information from the Bank of Greece, the Greek economy is facing acute liquidity problems. This is because a large part of the bank's revenues are directed to public enterprises whose deficits have assumed cataclysmic dimensions. Under such conditions, not only are there serious problems for financing the economy's private sector; discouraging effects on the market are also being created. Thus, there is much talk in Bank of Greece Governor Dim. Khalikias' circle about immediate recourse to the national right to issue currency, in order to finance the deficits presented by the public enterprises and organizations. This fact, however--observe leading economic factors--will strengthen the inflationary pressures and, subsequently, based on the present policy for interest rates, will make the investment climate even more negative. As for the prospects of stabilizing the economy, there are now many who believe it is not feasible. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 11 Jun 86 p 4] 9247

CSO: 3521/176



ECONOMIC

ITALY

BRIEFS

LOAN FOR PAKISTAN--Islamabad, 23 Jun (ANSA)--Italy will loan Pakistan about three-and-a-half million dollars to finance and support agricultural improvements using Italian know-how and an anti-tuberculosis program among Afghan refugees. The agreement was signed in this capital on Monday by Italian ambassador Amedeo de Franchis and Pakistan's secretary for economic affairs, M.A.G.M. Akhtar. Part of the finance will be used by the Central Asian state's agricultural research council to improve fruit and vegetable strains using varieties imported from Italy. [Text] [Rome ANSA in English 1039 GMT 24 Jun 86 AU] /12624

CSO: 3528/162

23 July 1986

## ECONOMIC

## TURKEY

## OZAL ECONOMIC WHEELS SLOWING DOWN

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 May 86 pp 1, 12

[Editorial by Hasan Cemal: "Notes from the Economic Bureau"]

[Text] People who keep up have probably noticed: The Ozal government's economic decision-making wheels are not turning as fast as they used to. Have they become too cumbersome? We do not know, but there is a discernible sluggishness at present.

This was not the case when ANAP [Motherland Party] came to power on the slogan "Getting the job done." If you recall, the Ozal government did not even wait for its program to be read in the Assembly before raising interest rates, for instance, but made the decision and put it into practice right away. Yet, this time, it took the Ozal administration a full 2 weeks to make a decision on interest rates.

There is still another point of interest: the "multiple voice" situation taking shape at the top of the economic bureaucracy. This phenomenon has been particularly noticeable on interest rates. The Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat [TFTUS] was saying interest rates "definitely" would not fall, while authoritative voices at the Central Bank were able to say "interest rates will come down 5 points." Meanwhile, the State Planning Organization [SPO] was publishing a report which considered interest somehow "a sin."

Finance, meanwhile, known to be the least "in" of the economic units, maintained its silence on interest rates. In fact, alongside the TFTUS which has taken wing, so to speak, with the Ozal government and dominates the economy, the Ministry of Finance has had to be content as just a "tax collector."

Other examples may be given of the "multiple voices" at the top levels of the economic bureaucracy. One is the disagreement between Treasury and the SPO over import policy. A current trend at the SPO is to reinforce protection barriers for local industry with high fund assessments and duties. In contrast, Mr Pakdemirli's under secretariat favors reducing the fund assessments a little more every year as a "requirement of liberalism."

Another interesting topic of dissension between the SPO and the TFTUS is the SEE's [State Economic Enterprises]. While the SPO bears responsibility for "privatization" of the SEE's, the undersecretariat oversees their operation. And it is said that the undersecretariat is trying to delay the sale of the SEE's for some time yet in order to avoid losing the credits obtained on the SEE's.

It has always been said that ANAP houses more than one trend under the same roof. The same situation may be said to exist at the pinnacles of the economic bureaucracy. It is said that "liberals" mostly comprise the top cadres of the TFTUS and the Central Bank, whereas, at the SPO, certain technicians stand out who lean toward the "national view" and may not believe in interest in their private lives.

The questions heard in the cloakrooms are these: Aren't disparate "trends" like these objectionable in an economy where fund disbursements amount to one-fifth of the state budget? Might Prime Minister Ozal undertake some "spring cleaning" in the economic bureaucracy?

Meanwhile, the amount of money in the marketplace is pushing 1.4 trillion liras despite "tight policies." The public sector will be content with an investment appropriation from the budget of around 1 trillion liras as "inflation will go wild later." Yet, Mr Ozal can pat himself on the back and brag about how the municipalities are making investments in the same amount.

As for the opportunity afforded by oil...

Every 1-dollar drop in the per-barrel price of crude oil represents a savings of \$135 on our country's oil bill. Turkey has been buying oil recently at \$21 a barrel, seemingly grabbing the chance to reduce the bill by \$1 billion. Among the claims being made is one that, a little dazzled by this opportunity, the government is not putting the energy it used to into dealings with the leading exporters on the Iranian and Iraqi markets. In fact, Iran's insistence on high oil prices and Iraq's reluctance to pay its debts have caused an extraordinary reduction in Turkey's foreign trade with these two countries.

How will the \$1-billion opportunity be used? What are the chances that it will be spent and gone? Will interest rates continue to fall? Will the SPO step up incentives? Will investments revive?

Similar controversial questions could go on and on.

But if you ask what will be done for the civil servant or the worker, we do not know.

Sad but true...

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CSO: 3554/71

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

#### HUNGARIAN CREDIT FOR THERMAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 May 86 pp 1, 11

[Text] Ankara (DUNYA) - The agreement on the credit totalling \$160 million to Turkey by Hungary has been approved by the Council of Ministers. Principles for the use of the first installment of \$80 million were also decided upon.

According to the agreement annexed to the Council of Ministers decision published in the RESMI GAZETE, \$80 million of the \$160 million credit signed during meetings of the Turkish-Hungarian Joint Economic Commission in Ankara at the end of January have been released for use.

Accordingly, an \$80-million portion, the first installment of the total of \$160 million to be used to finance the building of thermal powerplants in Turkey, will be directed only to the financing of commercial contracts to be concluded between Turkish and Hungarian companies and state organizations. According to the agreement, Turkey will issue a license for the goods it will import from Hungary based on the credit. The lists of goods to be exchanged between the two countries will be specified in the next few days.

Use of the first \$80 million installment of the \$160 million total agreed upon was attached to these principles:

Of the total f.o.b. value of each contract, 15 percent will be used in advance. Accordingly, the first half of the 15-percent portion will be released for payment against the letter of credit in advance, and the other half upon presentation of the loading papers. Half of the remaining 85-percent portion of the total f.o.b. value will be used as credit, and the other half in the form of extra commercial facilities which the Hungarian company will provide.

The agreement provides that the Central Bank and the Hungarian National Bank be responsible for implementation of the credit on behalf of the governments. The two banks will sign a brokerage agreement within 45 days to guarantee financial implementation. The total of each contract will be \$5 million, barring conclusion of a new agreement between the two banks, according to the agreement.

Principles for repayment of the \$80 million portion of credit provided by the agreement are:

If Turkey makes payment in the form of full installations and capital goods, repayment will be made in 20 equal installments every 6 months to be exempt from all duties, taxes and fees. If payment is made in goods connected with the machine industry, repayment of the credit will be made in a total of 16 installments paid every 6 months.

Meanwhile, the delegation headed by Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister Kaya Erdem which went to Hungary on an official visit yesterday will sign interim agreements on release of the second portion of the \$160 million in credit provided by this agreement, as well as on fulfillment of the conditions for use of the first portion.

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CSO: 3554/71



ECONOMIC

TURKEY

## CONSUMER, INVESTMENT GOODS IMPORTS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 May 86 p 11


[Text] ECONOMIC SERVICE - The foreign trade statistics published by the Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat document once more with "official data" the extraordinary increase of consumer goods imports in the past 2 years. According to the Treasury data, consumer goods imports rose 95 percent compared to the previous year during the first year the Ozal government was in office and rose 105 percent the second year. Data for the past 7 years, in fact, show that foreign exchange spent on consumer goods has increased a full ten-fold.

As opposed to the rapid rise in consumer goods imports, an important part of which is luxury consumer goods, the rate of growth in investment goods imports has regressed in the past 2 years. Investment goods imports rose 14 percent compared to the previous year, 1984, which was the Ozal government's first year, but remained at 1 percent last year.

In addition to the large increase in the amount of foreign exchange spent, the share of consumer goods imports in total imports is seen to have grown 100 percent. The share in total imports in 1979 was 1.9 percent, while this rate reached 4.4 percent in 1984 and 8.6 percent last year.

The foreign exchange sum spent on consumer goods imports was \$95.9 million in 1979, but progressed to \$170 million-\$180 million in the next 3 years. However, a total of \$437 million in foreign exchange went to consumer goods imports in 1984, following the even sharper growth trend of 1983, and this amount reached \$971 million last year.

Meanwhile, the figures in investment items imports were marked by a decline in both amount and share of total imports. The share of investment goods in total imports was 31.5 percent in 1979, our base year for comparison, and dropped to 20 percent in 1980. It rose again to 24.7 percent and 26.3 percent in 1981 and 1982 respectively. The share of investment goods imports in the total began declining the first year the Ozal government was in office and dropped to 24.7 percent the first year, or in other words, to the 1981 level, and to 23.7 percent last year. A total of \$2.659 million was spent on investment goods imports in 1984 and \$2.690 million last year.



- Key: 1. Investment Goods Imports  
 2. (\$million)  
 3. Consumer Goods Imports Expenditures for 7 Years  
 4. (\$thousand)

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20 AUGUST 1986